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Introduction
Among most developing countries, Thailand has been performing 
quite well if one concentrates on her economic growth. The average 
growth rate between 1970 and 1990 is fairly high at 6.7 percent per 
annum. Although official macroeconomic data before 1970 has not yet 
been updated, it is widely agreed that Thai economy also enjoyed 
considerable expansion as early as since 1950s. Among high and steady 
growth, instabilities did occur, however. Like other countries, 
Thailand has undergone several economic shocks, most of them were 
transmitted from outside the country but some emerged from the internal 
factors.
To the question upon assessment of the government's role in 
development process, the answer varies from positive side to negative 
side, depending on the area in which the questions are made, and also 
depending on the analysts' philosophical standpoint. For example, while 
the recent boom of Thai economy pleases most economists and government 
officials, there remain others blaming for its emphasis on overall 
growth while leaving the distribution of benefits from growth less 
attended. The dispute between the two ideologies is, however, beyond 
the scope of this report. The major objective of this report is to 
analyze and evaluate the macroeconomic performance of Thai economy since 
around 1960 from the viewpoint of positive economics rather than from 
the viewpoint of normative economics.
The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter 
describes the basic structure of Thai economy as well as the development 
of economic and political thoughts before 1960s. Chapter two describes 
the Thai economy and policies implemented during 1960-1990. These two 
chapters aim typically at providing facts for further analyses. More 
analytical discussions upon industrialization process in Thailand as 
well as its consequences will be available in the third chapter. The 
fourth chapter takes a look at the constraints and prospects of future 
economic development. Included is the global and regional opportunities 
facing Thailand, the internal fundamental problems which may obstruct 
further growth, and the recent progress of economic management in 
Thailand. Together with summary, the fifth chapter mentions some 
lessons that can be drawn from Thailand case.
Although many evidences or even arguments demonstrated in this 
report are those initiated in other documents by other analysts, the 
author still takes responsibilities to all possible errors and mistakes. 
Also, the views appear in the report need not necessarily correspond to 
either those of the author's affiliation or the Economic Planning Agency 
of the Government of Japan.
Chapter 1 
Thai Economy Before 1960s
Although remarkable changes in Thailand's economy have just 
taken place no longer than half a century, it is always advisable to 
take a short glance to her earlier developments in order to understand 
Thailand's historical backgrounds and the economic settings prior to the 
more well-known subsequent developments. The task is covered in this 
chapter. Some insights are given concerning the major characteristics 
of primordial Thai economy, the successive political and economic 
changes and their influences on changes in overall economic ideologies 
and policies until the early 1960s.
1.1 Na t u r a l  R e s o u r c e  W e a l t h i n e s s  a n d  Do m i n a t i o n  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e
There is no doubt that Thailand, like most other Asian countries 
located within the Monsoon zone, has long history as an agriculture- 
dominated nation. The importance of agriculture lied not only in the 
production structure but also in determining social, cultural and 
political structures. Large and fertile plain of the country's central 
region has high potential in growing lowland crops. The mountainous 
northern region was once an important source of wood products and forest 
goods, although its forest area has drained away rapidly as farm 
cultivation expanded. The south region has an equatorial climate which
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is suitable to tree crops, apart from the availability of tin and some 
other mineral resources.
The plentifulness of natural resources and large cultivatable 
area in the past had some important consequences. Firstly, it 
characterized the feudal system in the early days of the present dynasty 
regime as the one concentrated more on property right in man rather than 
the one relied on property in land. The slave system was developed in 
order to make assurance to the elites at the time the availability of 
workers, while the availability of land was not much the problem. 
However, as population grew faster than increase in cultivated land 
(since early twentieth century), property right in land became more 
important and the decline in real wage gave way to the abolishment of 
slave system in the subsequent years.1/ Secondly, easiness of opening 
new land had considerable impact on the underdevelopment of land-saving 
farm technology (uses of fertilizers and seed improvement, for example) 
before the World War II period. Instead, labor-saving technology had 
been more popular as can be seen from the heavy uses of tractors and 
other farm machines in the more irrigated areas after the World War II 
period.2/
Thirdly, the adequacy of domestic food supply had enabled 
Thailand to keep herself away from heavy trade with other countries. 
The self-sufficiency came to an end in 1855 when Thailand was forced to 
sign the °Bowring Treaty' with Great Britain. The major content of this
1 The agricultural land/labor ratio increased again in 1960s through early 1970s. This will be 
shown later in the next chapter.
2 In fact, there are other factors contributing to this technological trend, especially from the 
political point of view, see Feeny[1982,chapter 4,5 and 7],
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and other following treaties with other western superpowers was that, on 
import side, Thailand had to open its own economy to foreign goods with 
across-the-board low tariff rate3/ and, on export side, had to abolish 
the state trade monopoly. Since then, Thailand became gradually 
specialized in producing primary products, especially rice, and was not 
long an important food exporting country in the region.
The domination of agriculture on Thai economy was thereafter 
great. It did not only contribute to the largest part of the country's 
value added, but also to the largest part of the export receipts and 
government revenue. Rice export grew rapidly since the integration of 
Thailand into world market in 1850s. Quantity of rice export increased 
threefold in less than one decade (1857-1864), and more than twentyfold 
before the Second World War (1857-1940) .A/
The other major activities of the primitive Thai society was 
international trade. The importance of trade emerged as early as during 
the kingdom of Ayutthaya (1350-1767) and was strongly energized since 
1850s, when trade was opened to foreign companies according to the 
Bowring and other treaties. Most trades were inevitably those directly 
related to agriculture. Foods were exported in exchange of non-food 
imports. However, while agricultural products were mainly produced by 
majority of Thai farmers, trade was confined to the royal families and 
few elite groups. Government's income from trade was always the major 
source of its revenue. The relationship between the government and the 
rice producers (farmers) was thus established in the way that the latter
3 Not exceed 3 percent of import value.
4 Feeny[1982], table 3-1.
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supplied exportable rice and other primary goods while the former 
provided public irrigation services. However, this inter-dependency 
relationship applied only to farm areas around Bangkok, while the other 
outlying regions received very little attention from the central 
government.5/ Together with other more recent factors that will be 
discussed later when Thailand's industrialization is considered, this 
regional disparity of government's budget for agricultural development 
was another important contributor to the primacy of Bangkok and 
surrounding areas.
Although the high growth of agricultural sector has been very 
impressive, it was attained at the cost of extensive deforestation. The 
major source of Thailand's agricultural growth before 1960s was thus the 
exhaustion of her national resources rather than a significant progress 
of production technologies and factor productivities. The clear 
evidence is the high contribution of land expansion to the increase in 
agricultural output while yield increase contributed only little. As 
will be later seen, this trend resumed again after 1960.
1.2 C h a n g e s  i n Po l i t i c a l  a n d  Ec o n o m i c  Id e o l o g i e s
The period before 1960s was characterized by several major 
changes in both the economic and political environments in Thailand. 
From the political economic point of view, one cannot separate the 
impacts of either economic or political evolutions from the other.
5 Biggs and others[1990], p.25-26.
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There are always substantial interactions between the two. Here, some 
brief notes about the sequence and impacts of selected highlights of 
Thai economic history, since the political transform from the absolute 
monarchy system to the constitutional monarchy system (1932), will be 
made below.
A change to constitutional monarchy. The 1932 coup d'etat put 
an end to the absolute monarch that had ruled the country since its very 
primitive state. Series of conflicts between the king and the 
bureaucrats was the major seed of this coup. The conflicts were partly 
products of the extension of the king's power which was deemed (by the 
king) at the time necessary to resist the western imperialist threats, 
and also partly because of the worldwide depression which greatly and 
adversely effected Thai economy, in general, and the Thai bureaucrats, 
in particular.6/ The group carrying out the coup (the People's Party) 
blamed the previous government for its selfishness in forming the 
country's economic policies. However, the members of the People's Party 
had not yet agreed in what kind of economic policy they would pursued 
after the coup.
State Capitalism. The new government eventually found its own 
economic policy. State capitalism was adopted as its top prior policy. 
The idea was generally agreed upon although it was agreed from different 
motivations of different wings in the party.7/ Under the state 
capitalism, the government intervened the economy through establishing
6 Several public officials were dismissed in order to remedy the government budget problem.
7 The two distinctive purposes were the promotion of Thai interest in more profitable enterprises, 
on the one hand, and to create a self-sufficient economy in preparation for the coming second 
World War, on the other hand.
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many state-owned enterprises which received extensive and intensive 
privileges from the government. These enterprises rapidly dominated 
rice industry (exporting and milling), commerce and trade, and 
manufacturing industries. For example, more than half of rice mill 
production in late 1930s was in hand of only one state-owned rice 
miller. The state capitalism influenced the country since late 1930s, 
reaching its strongest stance after the World War II, and came to an end 
in late 1950s. Foreign capitalists were strongly discouraged, some were 
forced to cease operations and some had to sell their businesses to the 
government. The investment climate was thus very depressed and, when 
most public enterprises ran into financial trouble or even bankruptcy, 
Thai economy gradually faced the era of recession and slow economic 
growth.
One important consequence of the state capitalism under the 
military rulers was the superseding of Chinese business leaders in place 
of the former European business leaders. Many presently influential 
Chinese-Thai business groups formed their economic and political bases 
during these days through close cooperation with the military leaders. 
The Chinese business leaders provided financial funds for the 
establishment of many state enterprises and government companies in 
return to the government's protection to their businesses. Indeed, 
although Chinese businessmen seemed to suffered from the discriminative
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measures exerted by the government at the beginning8/, they later gained 
benefits.
Private investment promotion. The inefficiency of state
enterprises and government companies and the slow economic growth 
finally prompted a change, which actually took place after the 1957 coup 
d'etat. The new military ruler, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (who 
himself became a prime minister during 1959-1963) came to power with new 
economic policy. He adopted the development approach advised by the 
international agencies (especially the World Bank and the United 
States). Private investment was resumed, without discrimination against 
foreigners. A series of investment promotion acts was enacted which 
provided significant privileges to investments of larger and non- 
traditional industries.
1.3 Na t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  p l a n n i n g  a n d  m o v e m e n t  t o w a r d  m o d e r n
ECONOMY
The period between late 1950s and early 1960s was characterized 
by a rapid transformation of Thailand in both the basic economic 
ideology and the institutional framework. As far as changes in economic 
ideology is concerned, Thailand rapidly abated the state capitalism 
doctrine. The coverage of economic activities tied to state enterprises 
and government companies dwindled. These governmental enterprises' 
monopolistic power was reduced or in some case eliminated. The best
8 Originally, the military government protested particularly against Chinese businessmen as they 
thought that the later were supporting the communist insurgency in accordance to the victory of 
mainland China’s communist party in 1949
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example is the abolishment in 1956 of a state-owned rice company, the 
Thai Rice Co.,Ltd., which dominated rice export since 1938. Earlier, in 
order to boost rice export, the multiple exchange rates imposed on rice 
exporters was gave up in 1955.
The second important change was the government's explicit 
embracement of industrialization policy, through encouraging initiation 
by private sector. Several decrees aiming at promoting investment were 
enacted (in 1954,1958,1960, and 1962). A system of import tariff was 
invented so as to give domestic industries a heavy protection from 
competition aboard.
Several new government agencies, most of which became afterward 
important agencies in shaping the country's economic system, were 
established during this period. Among them are the Board of Investment 
[BOI:1959], the Bureau of Budget [BOB:1959] , the Industrial Finance 
Corporation of Thailand [IFCT:1959], the National Economic and Social 
Development Board [NESDB:1960] .
The NESDB released the country's first national economic plan in 
1961, covering a six years period between 1961-1966. The major 
objectives of the plan conformed principally to what suggested by the 
World Bank--providing a proper environment and conditions to stimulate 
high economic growth for both the short- and long-term. Resources were 
directed to construction of infrastructures, especially the construction 
of highway and road system throughout the kingdom. As already 
mentioned, encouragement of private investment was also the top 
priority. The Board of Investment granted promotion through tax and
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tariff exemptions and other privileges to selected firms meeting the 
criteria set by the board. The second National and Social Economic Plan 
(1967-1971) was basically designed to continue the same objective as the
first plan, but broadened the coverage of infrastructure construction to
the more remote areas.
The two central strategies undertaken under the first two 
national economic plans--the infrastructures construction and the 
investment promotion--had great impacts in shaping the succeeding Thai 
economy. The success of national highway and subsidiary road network in 
connecting most parts of the country benefitted in particular the 
agricultural export through reduced transportation cost9/. The
expansion of agriculture since the early 1960s was in large part 
attributed to improved transportation. Not only the export demand 
boosted the production of traditional crops but it also helped
introducing crop diversification. Many new crops were developed just to 
meet the export demand, some of them (cassava, for example) were almost 
totally exported.
Of course, manufactures also benefited greatly from better 
infrastructure. Given high protection from import aboard, various 
industries were finding larger domestic market also through greater
access to local market via improving transportation.
The period before 1960s was thus another most important period 
in Thailand's economic history. It represents a period of searching for
9 The other major, perhaps more important, motivation of transportation development was for the 
national security reason, since there was strong threat of communism at the time and most newly 
constructed roads were destined to the troublesome areas.
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the most suitable way of economic development. Many political and 
economic events occurred during this period had great impacts on the 
subsequent development since they always introduced a new social and 
economic rules. The period ended up with the market-orientation under 
distant guides of the government and U.S.-led international agencies.
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Chapter 2 
Thai Economy and Policies Implemented 
During 1960-1990
Thailand's backgrounds in both economic performance and 
institutional development before and during early 1960s formed the initial 
social settings for the subsequent economic development. In this chapter, 
a brief descriptive review of Thailand's economic experiences during the 
three-decades period (1960-1990) will be made. The period reviewed will be 
divided into three interval sub-periods; the period between 1960-1972, the 
period between 1973-1985, and the period between 1986-1990. An attempt to 
analyze in more details Thailand's industrial development strategies during 
this period will be made in the next chapter.
2.1 St e a d y  a n d  St a b l e  G r o w t h s  d u r i n g  1960-1972
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Thailand entered the 1960s 
decade with new economic and institutional frames developed during the 
second half of 1950s. Under more liberalized conditions for the private 
sector as well as extensive government's investment in infrastructures, 
Thai economy fared very well until the outburst of the first oil crisis in 
1973. The overall economic growth reached a high level of around 7-8 
percent per annum1/ with a fairly stable price level and manageable deficit 
on external front. Several factors explained this impressive success, 
among them the following factors seemed to be most important.
1 The officially updated figures on Thailand’s national income before 1970 are not yet available, but 
the high average growth of 1960s is undoubted.
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(a) Agricultural Growth. Freer trade regime on rice export 
apparently induced rapid expansion of cultivated areas. Even though 
various types of export tax were imposed2/, they were not as discouraging 
to rice export as did the state monopoly on rice trade and the multiple 
exchange rate system employed before 1960s. Other major crops also 
expanded significantly during this period. Maize production shown a rising 
trend since early 1960s through 1980s. Cassava and sugarcane, although 
they did not reveal much prosperity until early 1970s, was gradually 
accumulating their comparative advantages. These trends can be seen from 
Table 2.1 and figure 2.1, which show the planted areas of the four major 
crops in consideration. The rise of agricultural exports also provided 
necessary resources required to build the country's infrastructures and 
enabled the government to pursue its industrial promotion policy without 
causing either budgetary difficulty or mounting trade deficit.
(b) Industrial Growth. The wider opportunity opened to private 
industries after the subsiding domination of government's companies was 
reinforced by industrial promotion policy in gearing up Thailand's 
industrial expansion. The structure of industrial promotion at its initial 
stage benefited in particular those firms competing with imports, notably 
the light consumer industries. The most prominent industrial sectors being 
promoted were textiles, chemicals, food processing, automobiles assembling, 
etc.
(c) Foreign Investments and Foreign Aids. Though being already 
prominent, foreign investors played an even more important role in Thailand 
after the introduction of industrial promotion policy. Large influxes of 
foreign capitals flowed into Thailand both in term of direct investments
2 The most important export tax on rice was rice premium.
12
and loans. Japanese investments usually involved in manufacturing while 
European and American investments were more substantial in trading, 
servicing, engineering, and public works. All these capital inflows 
strengthened the balance of payment position during the 1960s. In 
addition, foreign aids was also large owing to the United States' military 
spending and grants to Thailand, in order to protest the permeation of 
communism in Southeast Asian region.
(d) Stability in the World Economy and International Financial
Market. The steady and stable growth in world economy before the collapse 
of the gold standard system during 1971-1973 was quite favorable and 
contributed chiefly to the concurrent stability of Thai economy. The 
average growth of industrial countries between 1960-1972 was 4.6 percent 
per annum while the average inflation rate was only 3.4 percent (Table
2 . 2 ) .
The favorable economic conditions during this period allowed the
government to do simple works. Apart from the industrial promotion 
policies and the public investment in various economic infrastructures, it 
can be said that the precept of macroeconomic policies of the Thai
government during 1960s and early 1970s was generally conservative and 
accommodative. Monetary policy, for example, was normally used to create 
and maintain both domestic and external stabilities--the targets in which 
it seemed to succeed quite well, thank partly to good export performance 
and partly to stable world economy. Under the Bretton Wood system, nominal 
exchange rate was kept constant to most major currencies. And when the 
realignment of world exchange system began to take place in early 1970s, 
Thai authorities chose to tie it currency (baht) to U.S. dollar, a currency 
in which most Thailand's trades were made. The constant value of baht with
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respect to U.S. dollar implicitly advantaged Thai export as the realignment 
at that time resulted in weakening of U.S. dollar. This might be another 
reason why the government tied the exchange rate to U.S. currency.
Fiscal policy was more offensive than monetary policy. The
government was running budget deficit due to its engagement to massive 
constructions of many public utilities and to subsidies given to industrial 
promotion. During 1960s, the major resources used to finance budget
deficit came from foreign loans and grants, particularly those from the
World Bank.3/
Direct price control was seldom used or at most loosely
implemented. This stemmed primarily, on the one hand, from the abundant
supply of domestic foods and, on the other hand, from the availability of 
non-food imports.
The monetary authorities (the Bank of Thailand) also provided
credit, through rediscount facilities, to some certain activities--such as 
agriculture, some industries, and exporting firms. The policy targeted not 
only at encouraging production but also at improving income distribution.
2.2 Ec o n o m i c  D i f f i c u l t i e s  o f 1973-1985
The 1960s decade of high growth and satisfactory stability of both 
the world and the Thai economies came to an end at the early 1970s. The 
gold standard was abandoned and many countries were forced to adopt 
floating rate system. Meanwhile, there existed also worldwide shortages of
3 The largest lender was the World Bank, constituting almost half of government’s loans during the 
Second Plan period (1966-1971). The World Bank’s loan and the U.S. military aids was estimated to 
supply around one-third of total capitals required by public sector (Suehiro [1985:p.A-7] )
4 Although the government charged high tariff on imports to prevent domestic import firms, it rarely 
banned imports.
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primary goods, pushing up the world inflation. Situations became much 
worse when oil prices jumped in 1973. Stagflation prevailed all over the 
world during 1974-75, deep recession together with exceedingly high 
inflation. After three years of recovery between 1976-78, the world 
economy was trapped again by the second oil shock, whose impacts lasted 
longer until 1982. The world growth rates and inflation rates are shown in 
table 2.2.
These economic tumults in the external front certainly affected 
Thai economy. The salient features of Thai economy between 1970 and 1990 
are summarized in table 2.3 and figure 2.2. One can also find the 
dependency of Thai economic performance on the world situation by comparing 
the movement in both the economic growth and inflation, which are presented 
respectively in figure 2.3 and figure 2.4. However, it is also true that, 
although the coincidence between Thai and world economies was general, they 
were not exactly parallel. Some divergences did occur, reflecting the 
element of Thai policies implemented during each period.
The following sections thus comprise two components; the highlights 
of economic phenomena that attributed to the overall fluctuation as well as 
the pertinent government policies regarding those problems.
Ups and downs of agriculture
Agricultural sector experienced both the robust time and sluggish 
time during 1970s and the first half of 1980s. In the first half of 1970s, 
production of cassava and sugarcane were expanded rapidly (figure 2.1 
again) as most transportation network was completed during the Second 
National Plan period [1967-71), making the potential comparative advantage
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in producing these crops realized. The realization process was also 
accelerated by the worldwide boom of most crop prices in early 1970s. 
Together with the continued prosperity of the other more traditional crops 
such as rice and maize, the agricultural sector as a whole enjoyed a 
satisfactory and steady growth in 1970s.
Situations changed rather drastically since about 1980. The world 
recession after the second oil crisis lowered demand for Thai agricultural 
exports. Export price of most major crops declined during 1981-1986. As a 
result, the total export value of five major crops (rice, rubber, maize, 
cassava and sugar) reached its peak in 1981 and hardly increased afterward
until 1987 (figure 2.5). On the supply side, land expansion-- the most
important factor of the agricultural growth since WWII--could not be 
undertaken as easily as in the past. The agricultural land/labor ratio 
reached its peak in 1978 and continually fell afterward.5/
The two oil shocks and the twin deficits
The outbreaks of the first and the second oil crises in 1973 and 
1979-1980 severely undermined the development path of Thai economy. During 
the first oil crisis, however, higher prices of imported oil did not hit 
the country's current account position immediately because export prices of 
primary products also augmented. The effect of the oil crisis thus emerged 
in exceptionally high inflation rate (table 2.3 and figure 2.2).
Intuitively, the policy response to the crisis was not much seriously
undertaken. Restricted money policy was implemented in first half of 1974 
and quickly turned to expansionary one in the later half of the same year
5 An*nar[1990], page 1.
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when general price did not rise further. The government also tried to 
stimulate the economy through budget deficit during 1975-76. Generally, 
the government authorities tended to regard the oil crisis as an short-term 
problem, since no adjustment policies were strongly implemented.
Thai economy recovered quickly during 1976-78. The average growth 
of the period reached around 10 percent per annum. However, the high 
growth was associated with high inflation and larger current account 
deficit. Though the current account deficit during this period was partly 
due to withdrawal of American military base from Thailand (implying a large 
drop of United States' spending), but the more important factor was the 
country's overspending. The expansionary budget deficit adopted between 
1975-76 had an important inheritance to the subsequent fiscal years that 
the structure of public spending (including that of state enterprises) 
tended to be an overspending one. The government failed to curb down its 
spending partly because of administrative reason and partly because of its 
own decision to increase public intervention in the economy. The result 
was thus the overheated economy and the chronic external imbalance.
Both the price instability and external imbalance existing in 1978 
put the country into a much more difficult position, when the second oil 
crisis took place, than during the first oil crisis. The situations in 
1972, the year before the first oil crisis, was much better than those in 
1978. Inflation rate was 7.9 percent and current account deficit was 
already 7.6 percent of GDP in 1978, while the corresponding figures in 1972 
were respectively only 4.8 and 0.6 percent (table 2.3). Moreover, there 
was no helping windfall such as the commodity price boom as during 1973-74. 
The impact of the second oil shock was thus very severe and the 
macroeconomic management became extremely difficult. An Economic slowdown
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took long time until 1982, recovered during 1983-84, and slumped again in 
1985.
To tackle the problem of economic slump and high inflation, the 
government still relied on expansionary fiscal policy and restricted 
monetary policy. These policies' success was very limited, however. 
Public spending succeed only marginally in stimulating the economy. The 
government's overspending was generally offset by reduced private spending. 
As shown in figure 2.2, during 1977-1985, the country's current account 
deficits (the saving-investment gap) were in almost every year produced 
entirely by public sector.
The large and prolonged external deficits caused tight money and 
undermined the public confidence. The security of many financial 
institutions and capital market as a whole was attenuated. Moreover, the 
high interest rate policy failed to attract foreign capital and thus failed 
to fix the problem of balance of payment deficit, because the international 
financial market was also in severe uncertainty. Above all, the 
competitiveness of the country was not improved satisfactorily.
2.3 St a b i l i z a t i o n  a n d  A d j u s t m e n t  Po l i c i e s  o f  1980s
The failure of macroeconomic policies in healing the country's 
chronic deficit on current account and balance of payment and also the 
increasing indebtedness bestirred some government officials to search for 
new solutions. However, as the fiscal policy was still a budgetary deficit 
one, the burden fell almost entirely on the monetary policy. Various 
traditional monetary measures were implemented, such as the interest rate 
adjustments, credit control, moral suasion. These policies had very little
18
success, which is not surprising because their command could never reach
the government activities.
There was a small adjustment of the exchange rate in late 1978.
But the movement was actually small, being unable to cure the existing
problems.
The chronic deficit eventually called for an immediate and
strenuous remedy efforts. The attempts at stabilizing and restructuring
the Thai economy came not only from the domestic awareness but also from
the propellant of the World Bank. The World Bank granted two special loans 
for Thailand's economic restructuring (SAL1 and SAL2), which were 
implemented during 1981-1983. The loan conditions required active 
adjustments in five areas, i.e., fiscal policy, agriculture, industry, 
energy, and institutional development.6/
The exchange rate was also adjusted twice in 1981 from 21 baht per 
U.S. dollar to 23 baht per U.S. dollar or 8.7 percent devaluation of baht 
against U.S. dollar. Though the devaluation rate was not substantial but 
was more meaningful than that adopted in 1978. There were two additional 
reasons for the 1981 depreciations. Firstly, it prevented Thai exports
from increasing value of U.S. dollar, which took place since around 1979-
1980 (figure 2.6). Secondly, the authority want to desist the speculation 
of the exchange market.7/
1981 was also the first year of active export promotion. Having
been cited as the national target since the third National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1972-77), the export promotion schemes were just
6 The evaluation of SAL1 and SAL2 can be found in Fh; tchitr and others [1987],
7 The ‘daily fixing’ system, which was undertaken since 1978, was another factor encouraging 
speculation.
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actually effective in this year when the government reduced most export 
taxes, rice premium, and liberalized other barriers to export.
Unfortunately, all these restructuring measures were not 
accompanied by a vigorous correction in fiscal stance. Government failed 
to depress its budget overspending. Instead, the private sector showed 
some progress, as can be seen from figure 2.2 that the overall current 
account deficits were lower than its public-induced component in 1982, 1984 
and 1985, which implicitly meant that there were some surpluses incurred by 
the private sector. Although there was a sharp decline of deficit in 1982, 
it was mainly due to the very slow growth of both agriculture and non­
agriculture production which led to import cut, rather than success in 
raising export. Gloomy world condition as well as persistently high 
proportion of government investment to GDP were the major obstacles. The 
large and prolonged deficits of current account caused a rapid accumulation 
of the country's external debt, reaching its peak (as measured in 
proportion to GDP) in 1985 (table 2.3).
Another series of adjustment measures was thus necessary. This was 
endeavored since late 1984. Two important macroeconomic strategies were 
finally achieved.
The first strategy was the switch of exchange rate regime to a 
'basket system' in November 1984; the value of baht has been since then 
tied to a basket of major traders' currencies, rather than fixed to a 
single US dollar. The effective devaluation rate at the first day of the 
regime switch was 14.8 percent. More interestingly, the basket system also 
gives a 'manageable room' to the monetary authority (the Bank of Thailand) 
in secretly managing the baht value through changing the weight structure 
of currencies in the basket Through this way, the monetary officials at
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the Bank of Thailand actually managed the exchange rate by increasing the 
U.S. dollar's weight in the basket after its sharp decline since late 1985. 
Albeit implicitly, this could be counted as the third 1980s' important baht 
devaluations with the first two explicitly announced in 1981 and 1984.
All the above exchange rate measures have one common target, 
promoting export. The weakened value of baht has actually played the 
important role in boosting Thai export since 1986.
The second strategy was the effective control on public spending 
and installation of discipline of external debt creation by the central 
government and the state enterprises. A * zero-growth' fiscal policy was 
adopted in 1986 and 1987, freezing the government's overall real spending 
not to exceed the previous year level. The newly created external debt by 
public sector was controlled by setting up an upper limit in each year. 
Even though government agencies or state enterprise may be able to bargain 
for their borrowing plans, the overall amount of new created debt must be 
under the bound. Intuitively, one could expect strong opposition to this 
belt-tightened policy from both the bureaucrats and some politicians. It 
is intuitive because Thai bureaucrats has been for long time forming 
influences in both the political and administrative concerns, and many 
politicians were also enjoying political advantages by means of large 
public spending. In general, this was true, as being evident from the 
persisting budget deficit for almost a decade before the reform. The 
reform in 1984-85 was politically possible because there was concurrently a 
restructuring of political power.
In addition to the macroeconomic measures, another area recording 
substantial progress since 1985 was the export promotion schemes. The tax 
cuts on agricultural export were continued and rice premium (the heaviest
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export tax on agriculture) was completely given up in 1986. The 
liberalization of agricultural trade was due partly to export promotion 
scheme and was partly aimed at alleviating farmers' suffer from downward 
trend of export prices during 1981-1986.
Other attempts in promoting exports were also made solicitously. 
Many export incentives, both financial and non-financial ones, were 
invented. The government and private sector cooperated for the first time 
in enhancing Thai export' share in existing markets and in seeking new 
markets. A joint committee consisting of both the government personnels 
and private business leaders was established, opening for wide range of 
discussions and cooperation.8/ Government-related export procedures were 
eased. Quota bonus were granted to exporters who succeeded in finding new 
markets.
2.4 Ec o n o m i c  Pr o s p e r i t y  d u r i n g  1986-1990
After more than a half-decade of economic difficulties and 
strenuous management of macroeconomic policy--both the stabilization and 
adjustment policies, Thailand has since 1986 entered her historic era of 
prosperity. The economy, which passed a recovery in 1986, expanded at an 
exceptionally high rate of more than 10 percent per annum during 1987-1990. 
The initial growth engine was stimulated by export demand beginning since 
1986, which kept on growing at very high rate during 1987-90, although some 
sign of slowdown was already seen in 1990. Investment demand was closely 
following export demand, growing rapidly since 1987 and still performed 
quite well before the explosion of military conflict in Persian Gulf.
8 The Joint Public/Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC).
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Private consumption was not grow very fast during the first three years of 
current boom (1986-88), even though its growth rates were higher than 
during the slump period, but began to accelerate in 1989 and 1990. The 
initial slow growth of consumption reflected partly its sacrifice for 
export demand and also indicated that Thai people tended to save more in
response to accelerated increase of investment returns. Public spending
also just recently shown rising trend in 1989 because of belt tightened 
policy adopted since 1986. Price level was rather stable, in spite of high 
growth, as there was not threat of high inflation from aboard.
Several factors were underlying the recent economic impressiveness. 
The most important ones may be as follow.
1. Favorable change in the external environment. Since 1986, there 
was a sharp decline in oil prices. Meantime, major currencies 
realignment starting in December 1985 also greatly benefited Thai 
exports as baht value, mostly fixed to US dollar, weakened 
steadily against the yen and major European currencies.
2. Relocations of investment from Japan and Asian NIEs to Southeast 
Asia, including Thailand. Because of increasing Yen and also 
rapid transition of most Asian NIEs away from producing labor- 
intensive manufactured goods, investment in these cheap-labor 
Southeast Asian countries became more attractive.
3. Success of adjustment policies and export promotion measures. 
Effective control of public expenditure and external debt
creation since 1986 helped mitigate the chronic financial problem 
facing Thailand during 1979-1985. Reinforced by strong increase 
of export, more resources wer available for the current boom of 
private investment.
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4. Political stability of 1980s. There was relatively more political
stability during the premiership of General Prem Tinasulanon 
between 1980-1988. Only two failed coup d'etat in 1981 and 1985 
were attempted. Although several cabinet reshuffles and 
parliament house dissolves did occurr, most political disputes 
were solved democratically. This political peacefulness
considerably supported steady economic development and encouraged 
investment9/.
5. Recoveries of major crops' price. After suffering from lowering 
world prices during 1981-1986, most major crops' price picked up 
in 1987, and remained on high track till the 1990/91 planting 
year. Benefits from external price improvement have reached 
farmers substantially, as agricultural exports are not subject to 
high tax and tariff as they did in the past. The most obvious 
evidence was the unchanged distribution of income over 1985-1988, 
after its ever-worsening trend over the past three decades, in 
spite of rapidly increased income of the relatively-richer 
exporters and industrial entrepreneurs.
With these favorable economic conditions, the government's policies 
are now shifting to the assurance of growth sustainability and other long­
term and more fundamental problems such as income distribution improvement, 
regional development, preparation of human capital. An emphasis is also 
put on social development as indicated in the coming Seventh National 
Economic and Social Development Plan.
9 The present Coup has not been considered yet. Hopefully, its economic impacts should be minimal.
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Chapter 3 
Thailand’s Industrialization
One obvious trend in the development of Thailand is that industrial 
sector has been gaining increasing importance compared to the used-to-be 
dominating agriculture, when considered from either its relative size in 
total production or trade. The growth rates of value added from
manufacturing production during 1970-1989 averaged to 9.5 percent per 
annum, more than double that of agriculture (table 3.1). The value added 
originated from agricultural sector was surpassed by that of industrial 
sector in 1978, and by manufacturing in 1981 (table 3.2 and figure 3.1). 
Currently, the industrial sector constitutes about one-third of the 
country's total production, while the agriculture constitutes only 15 
percent. Thailand is thus no longer an agricultural economy as she was in 
the past, but a country at the initial stage of full industrialization.
Yet, there is a chronic problem of Thai industrial development, the 
industrial sector always fails to absorb a significant size of employment 
into its thriving activities. About two-third of Thai labor force still 
engages in less thriving and even falling agricultural production. The gap 
between per capita value added and income between these two sectors 
(agriculture versus industry) has been widening almost without any period 
of exception. This represents one of the most critical problem of 
structural imbalance in Thailand, which relates to many other fundamental 
problems such as high income inequality, regional disparities, segmented 
labor market, educational imbalance. These related fundamental problems 
will be mentioned to in the next chapter. In this chapter, emphasis will
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be put on the characteristics and consequences of Thailand's industrial 
development.
3.1 Th e  Ea r l y  St a g e s  o f  Th a i In d u s t r i e s
When compared to other more developed Asian countries such as Japan 
or South Korea, Thailand is a late-comer in term of industrial development. 
The wealthiness of natural resources and the abundance of food supplies had 
lessened the necessity of Thailand in producing her own industrial goods in 
order to trade for basic foods and goods.1/ The only prevailing non- 
agricultural activities were handicraft works of household appliances and 
cultivating tools. These activities did not employ high, or even 
intermediate, production technics and were usually not commercialized. The 
manufacturings were basically part-time activities, during the dry season 
when farmers did not have much farm works.
Thailand began her first prominent and full-time manufacturing in 
rice milling industry, which spread throughout the country after the 
specialization in rice production and rice export brought about by various 
trade treaties beginning in 1855 (see chapter 1) . The consequence of these 
trade treaties was the rapid expansion of Thailand's international trade 
volume. Industries developed during this period were those relating to 
agricultural trade activities; rice milling, teak industry, shipping, 
banking and insurance, etc. These industries were under controls of three 
distinguished economic groups--the European trading houses, the state and 
bureaucratic officials, and the Chinese-Thai businessmen.
1 This was evident by sparse trade among regions in primitive Thai society.
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Since its initial formation in mid nineteenth century, Thai 
industries had underwent various shocks, both economic and political ones. 
The consequence of the 1932 constitutional revolution was the
discouragement of foreign investments and promotion of state-control 
economy. This economic nationalism ideology lasted till late 1950s, 
although its content changed occasionally during the period between 1930s 
to 1950s. The outbreak of the Second World War provided great opportunity 
for the Chinese-Thai business groups to develop their economic bases via 
occupying the room left by the European and Japanese economic giants. The 
coup d'etat of late 1950s brought an end to the state capitalism and
introduced the industrial promotion policy that encourage private 
investments, both foreign and local investments.
The early development of industries in Thailand before the era of 
industrial promotion policy had several distinct characteristics, some of 
them remain true through the present days.
Firstly, although most industries were trade-related, but very few 
were related to exporting of manufactured products. Rather, they 
concentrated on either exporting agricultural products and other resource- 
based materials (teak, tin, for example) or importing finished and 
manufactured consumer products from aboard. Only few other industries had 
also developed, such as manufacturing of cements, construction materials, 
and some simple chemicals. These industries had a common feature that
their products used local materials intensively and were basically non­
tradable goods.
Secondly, foreign investments played significant roles in 
Thailand's industrialization by participating in almost all industrial 
activities, in both forms of wholly-ovaed enterprises and joint-ventures
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with Thai investors. The only exception was during the period of state 
intervention (1946-1957), and just after the intervention was abolished 
foreign investments resumed almost instantaneously.
Thirdly, since most industries developed dependently on 
international trade, their firms' locations and activities tended to 
cluster within and around Bangkok, the only city possessing all facilities 
suitable to external trading; big harbor, administrative center, the 
country's best communication system, mobilized labor supply, etc. The 
development of Thai industries was thus parallel with the enlargement of 
Bangkok, making it the only primate city over all other cities in Thailand.
3.2 In d u s t r i a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  s i n c e  1960s
Since late 1950s, when the promotion of private-led investments 
began, the industrial sector has been expanding very rapidly. At the same 
time, the various themes of the investment policies, which can be best 
represented by the underlying industrial promotion acts, have been 
gradually shaping the structure of Thai industrial sector. The indusstrial 
promotion acts set certain criteria those are to be met by eligible firms. 
Changing the criteria thus inflences directly the advantage and 
disadvantage among industrial sectors.
Table 3.3 summarizes the contents of promotional measures provided 
by each acts. Two points can be drawn from the table. First, for eligible 
firms, the granted privileges tend to be more and more advantageous. For 
example, the first industrial promotion act in 1954 gave incentives only to 
import tariff of factors used in production. The later promotion acts 
extended the coverage of privileges to include also business tax and
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corporate income tax. Besides, period of the tax exempt or tax reduction 
were extended and were made more flexible. The 1977 act also allowed 
personal income tax exemption on dividends paid by promoted firms.
The second point is the increasing privileges given to export 
industries since the 1972 industrial promotion act. Under all the 
promotion acts before 1972, only export sales by promoted firms were
granted either tax exempt or tax reduction, but since 1972 these fiscal
incentives has also been applied to imports of raw materials and major
components used in producing exported commodities.
Another new element in 1972 act is the establishment of 'investment 
promotion zone', firms located within which receive more privileges in 
addition to those privileges normally received according to their promoted 
status (see details in table 3.3).
The promotion incentives and the rapidly declining monopoly of the 
state-owned companies since 1960s helped creating new industries and firms 
whose sizes were larger than most traditional firms. The founders of these 
firms were typically those formerly engaged in merchant business, 
particularly the importers and domestic distributors. Foreign firms also 
quickly came to Thailand to either establish their affiliates (mostly 
European and American investors) or to join local firms establishing 
various joint-ventured industries (mostly Japanese investors).
During 1960s, the productions of these newly-established firms were 
mainly to substitute imports. Although they used higher production 
technology than the traditional firms, the technology used was generally 
not much advanced. In addition, because of tax incentives given to imports 
of inputs and raw materials, many firms tended to employ technology based 
heavily (almost entirely) on imported inputs. In other words, the
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technology and production line was entirely imported, there were no 
adaptation of technology to be more suitable to local abundant inputs and 
raw materials. As a result, although imports of finished goods were 
reduced, imports of machineries and intermediate products were accelerated 
(Pranee Tinakorn, p. 179-180 and table 6). The growth of industrial 
production thus did not help reducing total imports as the import- 
substituion strategies suggested, it only changed import structure. The 
promoted industries that reflected this symptoms were, for example, 
textiles industry, automobile assemblers, and pharmaceuticals.
The awareness to this weakness of the past promotional policy was 
one of the reasons why the government added the export promotion measures 
to the 1972 investment promotion act. Unfortunately, it was not until mid 
1980s that these export promotion measures were fully realized. The 
persistent slump of world and Thai economy during 1970s and the first half 
of 1980s were the major obstacles, since the whole industrial sector itself 
suffered the economic slowdown. Foreign investors were reluctant to expand 
their investments and some even withdrew or sold their equities to local 
partners.
The decline of foreign capital after the oil shocks and the 
subsequent sluggish economic conditions brought about another industrial 
restructuring in term of ownership structure. Local industrialists took 
this opportunity in enlarging their industrial coverages in places of their 
former foreign partners, with financial support from local commercial 
banks. The commercial banks, especially the few largest ones, also began 
to expand their empires to various industries by establishing their own 
firms, but these firms were generally much smaller than those of the former 
industrial groups initiated during late 1950s and early 1960s. The
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cooperation between the local industrial groups and the local commercial 
banks has formed a kind of industrial-financial conglomerates which emerged 
to be competitors of the foreign firms.
Since 1986 until present, Thai industries has entered a new period
of rapid growth. This time, the features of growth is quite different from 
that of 1960s in the sense that it is the exporting industries that have 
been driving the overall industrial growth. Although several factors 
explain this impressive performance (as indicated in section 2.4), the 
realization of export promotion privilege initiated since 1972 is another 
important factor. Figure 3.2 shows that the export value of manufactured 
products jumped dramatically since 1986, resulting in a rapid rise of their 
share in total export. More interestingly, the structure of manufactured
exports has also changed remarkably. Several new products have been making
rapid progress in exporting. These products are, for example, precious 
stones and jewelry, footwears, integrated circuits, furnitures, and 
artificial flowers. The general difference of these new export goods from 
those of the import substitutes during 1960s and 1970s is their higher 
labor-intensiveness and less dependency on foreign technology. This is a 
promising phenomenon, and will be discussed in more details in the next 
chapter.
In sum, the emergence of labor-intensive export industries together 
with the rise of independent local entrepreneurs against foreign 
entrepreneurship suggests an industrial restructure during 1986-87 in term 
of the dominant capital and also in term of industrial structure. However, 
since 1987, foreign investors rapidly came back to join the prosperous 
export opportunity.
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3,3 Co n s e q u e n c e s  o f  In d u s t r i a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  in Th a i l a n d
There are numerous consequences of industrial development in 
Thailand. First of all, it is a matter of fact that, however heavily 
criticisms have been made on the government's industrial policies, the 
industrial sector has undeniably shown the very good and steady growth 
performance and has increasingly contributed to the overall economic growth 
during the past three decades. The only possible and solid ground for the 
critics is that, the outcomes could have been better both to the country 
and the industrial sector itself if the government had conducted its 
industrial policies some other ways.
In this section, emphasis is made on the unpleasant consequences of 
Thailand's industrialization. It is arranged so not because of the 
author's prejudice against industrial development, but because the positive 
side of the industrialization is so apparent that restating about its is 
somewhat redundant. On the other hand, exploration of its negative 
consequences can be useful to the formation of further policies to correct 
them. Thus, the following points concerning the impacts of Thailand's 
industrial development undertaken since 1960s are based on both the 
observable facts and also on the criticism basis.
1) The introduction of investment promotion policy in late 1950s 
was the major stimulus to the formation and initiation of most of the 
present largest industries and also industrial business groups in Thailand. 
A careful investigation of the years these industrial groups founded their 
core industrial firms clearly justifies this argument.2/
2 Suehiro, op.cit., p. 4-57.
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2) The BOI's prerequisite criteria of the minimum amount of 
investment to be eligible for promotion had obviously benefited large firms 
or large business groups. The criteria follows the belief that large 
investments were essential for the promoted firms in developing themselves 
to a level that the economy of scale be realized. However, this policy 
adversely and seriously effected small firms existing before the advent of 
industrial promotion policy, and discouraging further developments of such 
firms.
3) Since only a few large firms have been promoted. The new number 
of promoted firms has made them viable in making business in a small 
domestic market like Thailand3/. In many industries, the markets were 
oligopolistic without strong competition, although the situation became
better when market size expand gradually. The lack of fierce competition
among domestic firms is probably the most relevant explanation of relative 
inefficiency of promoted Thai firms in comparison to the successful models 
of Japan during that country's import substitution period.
4) Another unpleasant consequence of the promotion given only to 
large investments was the laggard technological development. As mentioned 
earlier, almost only former merchant businessmen started manufacturing 
production, since they were the only groups being capable of collecting 
adequate capital to meet the BOI's requirement. In contrast, small 
manufacturers at the time, who directly engaged in production and had more 
enthusiastic attitude to technological development, hardly received 
government's privileges. The merchant-originated manufacturers typically
3 Although the total population size is not (and was not) too small, but because of very unequal income 
distribution, the number of populations that are capable of buying high value-added manufactured 
products is quite limited. Moreover, these people tend to prefer imported consumer goods than the 
domestically produced ones.
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relied on foreign technologies channeled through foreign partners, while 
they themselves played their experienced roles in firm and financial 
management and product distribution. Therefore, transfer of production 
technology has been invariably slow and limited, not only because of the 
foreign firms' unwillingness to commit the transfer but undeniably also 
because of the lack of Thai manufacturers' enthusiasm. By the same logic, 
the adaptations of technology are very limited. There has been few weak
evidences that technologies were adapted to be more suitable to local 
resource abundance. Apart from the factor price distortion in favor to 
capital-intensive technologies induced by industrial promotion policy, the 
less importance the local entrepreneurs gave to technological independence 
should bear another responsibility.
5) The subsequent impact of technological dependency of Thai 
industries is the entailed imports of machineries, major components, and 
raw materials. The contribution to country's trade balance has thus not as 
fruitful as that suggested by the basic idea of industrial development. As 
mentioned in the previous section, this embodied burden of industrial
growth was quite evident during the import substitution era (1960s and 
1970s). More interestingly, even during the current export boom, in which 
more independent industrial structure has been expected, imports of 
capitals and machineries are still high and increasing. As a result,
Thailand is again experiencing the rapidly increasing trade deficit in
machineries and raw materials (figure 3.3). This reflects the fact that 
the current investments, consisting also of the rapidly resuming foreign 
investment since 1987, still rely insistently on imported technology.
6) As far as the locational distribution of industrial bases is
concerned, it is quite obvious hat most industrial firms tended to locate
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within Bangkok and surrounding provinces. This has been one of the major 
causes of the problem of regional disparity. Given the fact that the 
contribution to the national income of the industrial sector is growing 
while its labor absorptive capability has not yet shown much progress, and 
the fact that rural-to-urban migration (especially migration to Bangkok) 
could be limited from the problem of increasing urban congestion, it is 
difficult to expect any significant improvement in regional disparity in 
the near future.
7) From the basis of resource allocation , the typical accusation 
frequently directed to industrial development policy is that it induced 
distortion of relative factor price, generally between capital and labor. 
Prices of imported machineries, components and intermediate goods have been 
artificially lower than their shadow prices, thus discouraging their 
domestic productions. Although there are some firms obtaining government's 
incentive in producing intermediate products or capital goods, their 
proportion in total promoted investment is small relative to those 
producing finished consumer products. Labors explicitly suffer from 
underemployment due to distortedly lower labor demand as firms tend to use 
capital-intensive technologies which are encouraged by subsidized imported 
capitals.
According to traditional trade theory, price distortion brings 
about inefficient resource allocation and thus reduce the social welfare. 
The only justification for this sort of industrial promotion policy is the 
necessity to correct market failure in the context that market operation 
may lack the capability of realizing potential comparative advantage the 
country has in certain industries. Through this room, appropriate measures 
can help shorten the time needed for such dynamic comparative advantage
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realization. As far as the industrial promotion policy in Thailand is
concerned, however, the roles of the government in accordance to the
realization process seem to be hardly justified. It is not quite clear
that the failure to implement more appropriate policies (the existence of 
these more appropriate policy is not too far from reality when considering 
the success of the NIEs countries) is due to the government's lack of 
capability, or due to the government's lack of intention.
8) The final point concerns the recent changes of philosophical 
background of industrial promotion policy. The excellent export
performance of labor-intensive products is so impressive that it is 
introducing changes in basic philosophy of industrial development policy to 
be more promotive to labor-intensive export industries. Indeed, there have 
been some proposals suggesting the reform of the Board of Investment (BOI) 
to be an export promotion agency rather than the industrial promotion 
agency. Secondly, promotion of regional industrialization is gaining 
increasing attention. Privileges are to be given to those industries 
planning to locate their sites outside Bangkok. Generally speaking, these 
two recent movements are welcome. The problem remains on how to assure 
that meaningful measures in achieving these goals be invented and 
appropriately implemented. Again, intention and capability to understand 
the problems of the government authorities are the most important and 
necessary factors.
In summary, although the evaluation of Thailand's industrialization 
is quite positive in term of growth performance of industrial sector, the 
development strategies are subject to strong and variable criticisms, in 
the sense that various fundamental problems are by-products. 'Growth 
without development' is the most common description given to such kind of
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'industrial development'. However, there seems to be basic changes of 
industrial policy which has to be closely looked at, and further 
evaluations are needed.
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Chapter 4 
Constraints and Opportunities of 
Future Developments
In the preceding three chapters, some succinct insights of 
Thailand's economic development since her early stage have been discussed. 
One distinct feature of development is that, supported by steady 
availability of resources extracted from her abundant natural resources, 
huge amount of labor force, and sizable fertile area, and by means of 
fairly well-planned policy packages focused on long-term development, 
Thailand has been rapidly restructured from agricultural economy to an 
industrial one. Economic growths in agricultural sector not only 
strengthened the overall economic growth but also provided necessary 
savings and foreign exchanges that helped establishing the country's 
industrial base, most remarkably through the government's industrial 
promotion policies. The industrialization policy started paying off after 
the government turned to exports promotion policy, the advantage of which 
has been realized impressively when the world economy became favorite to 
Thai economy since mid-1980s. Industries, in general, and manufacturing, 
in particular, thus steadily and rapidly replace agriculture as the major 
productive sector and major source of foreign earnings.
In short, one can say that during the past three decades, Thailand 
has been strengthening her own economy through steady transformation from 
natural-resource-based economy to higher-skilled economy.
But, can Thai economy peiform as well as in the past in the future 
world of increasing uncertainty and fiercer competition? More importantly, 
how effectively should economic managements be initiated and implemented
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amidst the rapidly destroyed natural resources and the less advantageous 
external conditions? Obviously, answering these questions is not an easy 
task, but it is useful to explore the conditions Thailand is subject to, 
and to evaluate constraints and opportunities of future development. It is 
the main focus of this chapter.
The chapter begins with exploration of the current environments as 
well as the outlook at both the global and regional level. These global 
and regional conditions are a predetermined environment to which Thailand 
has to adjust herself. The consideration of the internal factors will 
follow in the ensuing section. The focus goes to various fundamental 
problems that could retard development, and the recent attempts and 
progress of economic management to overcome those constraints.
4.1 Pr o s p e c t s  o n t h e  G l o b a l  a n d  Re g i o n a l  En v i r o n m e n t s
There are two general trends being developing in the current world 
economy. The first trend is the high probability of worldwide economic 
slowdown, which put an end to the longest period, beginning in 1982, of 
steady economic growth after the World War II. The United States is 
probably the first economy confronting the economic difficulty. However, 
even though the slowdown of world economy is inevitable, there can be 
various concerns about its pace and the associated degree by which each 
countries are going to pass through. It is not quite untrue to argue that 
one common view widely agreed upon is that there is minimal possibility of 
immediate and severe shocks that could startle the whole world overnight 
like those of the first and the second oil shocks. The rational and fairly 
efficient operation of the world oi market during the threatening period
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of the Gulf Persian conflicts, which developed later to a war, can be an 
evidence of improvement of world economic mechanism in dealing with 
experienced international problems. Also, the termination of the Cold War 
and the widespread democratization in various socialist countries are 
breaking the political wall that used to block international economic 
cooperations. Although the full benefit of gains from trade between these 
ex-socialist countries and the more developed capitalist world is not 
likely to appear in the near future, its on-going development can hopefully 
help preventing the worldwide recession. However, there remains also some 
perils to the future international economic cooperation. The sluggish 
negotiation of the current GATT round might end up in severe trade war and 
destructive protectionism. In such case, no country can avoid the economic 
pain and the world as a whole may be accelerated to recession.
The second trend in the world economy is the gradual, but 
persistent, change of economic poles from Western economies to Japanese and 
some other Asian economies. Prolonged surpluses in trade and service 
balances of these countries, especially Japan, now result in their 
expanding assets and entrepreneurship throughout the world. The capital 
flows associated with their investments are playing increasingly important 
role in determining the growth structure among regions and among countries 
within each region. Admittedly, the direction and amount of international 
funds are not solely determined by the situations or internal motivation 
prevailing in the source-of-funds countries, but depend also on the 
prospect of the destined economies. In other words, both factors in the 
countries of origin and factors in the countries of destination together 
influence the capital flows.
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From Thailand's position, the importance of the second trend 
(regional capital flows) seems to outweighs that of the first trend (the 
global economic outlook)1^ . Several reasons account for this argument. 
Among others, the following points could be made.
Firstly, Thailand's manufactured exports still account for a very 
small proportion of the total world manufactured trade (only 0.1 percent in 
1987)2/, any mild stagnation of world economy could has minimal effect on 
Thai export. Indeed, past evidences already show that Thailand could enjoy 
steady and high export growth rates amidst the gloomy internationally trade 
condition.
Secondly, although there are more alternative regions in the world 
for rapid development in the future, the most attractive for the time being 
is still the Asian (Eastern and Southeastern in particular) region, to 
which Thailand belongs. The long period of sustainable growth and better 
preparation for future development are the region's major advantages. 
Should the world economy slow down, the region is likely to be able to 
maintain its economic sustainability. Thailand, in particular, may be in 
better position relative to those Asian NIEs because she has not yet 
seriously confronted problems arising from rapid economic restructuring 
(labor dispute, for example) as those countries are facing.
The third reason is the importance of foreign direct investment to 
Thai economy. Historically, the economic development of Thailand can never 
be put apart from the umbrella of foreign capital. This fact is 
particularly true in the case of industrial development. As already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this is also true in the present days.
1 Although the two trends are not independent to one another, for simplicity, they are considered 
separately.
2 Dapice and Flatters [1988],
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Large amounts of foreign investment has been continually entering Thailand 
to enjoy the prosperity of the current export boom.
Fourthly, high dependency of Thai industries to foreign 
technological reinforces the importance of foreign investment in course of 
Thailand's economic growth.
If the above interpretations are correct, the changing pattern of 
capital flows among regions and within the region represents the most 
important external factor effecting Thailand. As insisted earlier, the 
flows of international capitals are still expected to favor the Asian 
region against the others, the concern then confines only to the capital 
flows within Asian region in general and the capital flows toward Thailand 
in particular.
As far as the regional economic environment is concerned, one 
prominent trend during the recent years is the rapid rise of Southeast 
Asian countries to be one of the most attractive investable zone in the 
world. In addition to the traditional capital flows from Japan and Western 
economies, there has been also newly emerging flows from the Asian NIEs3/. 
In Thailand, the most remarkable investments belonging to this countries 
group are those from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The rising labor cost and the 
increasing protection the industrial countries direct to Asian NIEs are the 
major forces driving them to find new production bases in Southeast Asia 
including Thailand. The pressure to investment aboard also reveals a more 
general sign that the Asian NIEs' economy has been stepping into a level 
where structural problems induced by rapid growth becomes serious and
3 South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong
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further restructuring is needed*1/. Thailand and other ASEAN countries can 
use this opportunity to develop and catch up with the NIEs.
The above consideration of global and regional environment facing 
Thailand is certainly far from complete. In addition to these very broad 
trends, there remains other factors requiring further discussion. 
Technological change is one of the most important factors capable of 
reshaping the trade and development pattern in both the regional and global 
level. How rapid a country can catch up with those more advanced countries 
depends largely on its capability in acquiring, adapting, developing, and 
assimilating the most suitable technologies for its own economy. In this 
frontier, Thailand apparently requires much more efforts in sparking 
sufficient progress.
4.2 Th e Co n s t r a i n t s  f r o m  Fu n d a m e n t a l  Pr o b l e m s
The past development yields not only positive impression on 
economic growth but also negative by-products. The unpleasant consequences 
of industrial development discussed in the previous chapter are examples. 
Many of these problems turned to be more and more serious and, if not 
corrected, can be major constraints to Thailand's future development. This 
is particularly true in the 1990s, provided that most external favorable 
conditions during the later half of 1980s are fading away. The effective 
exchange rate of baht ceased weakening since late 1988, and the global 
economy may be about to be recessive.
A See Park [1991] for more details of South Korea case.
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Some of these fundamental problems and their relevances to the 
course of development process will be pointed out and briefly discussed 
here.
Production imbalance. labor market segmentation. and education
problem
The existing imbalance of employment structure, between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sector, when compared to the production 
structure (or their value-added shares) is one of the most serious problem 
in Thailand. Currently, the per capita value-added in non-agriculture is 
almost ten times of that in agriculture5^ . One of the closest associated 
problem is the problem of segmented labor market. Generally speaking, the 
labor market in Thailand has been well divided into formal and informal 
market, the labor categories attached to each of which have quite 
distinctive characteristics (educational background and level of nonfarm 
skill are major differences, and also other related socio-economic 
factors). The two labor groups are separated almost exclusively. The 
sharp different situation between labor shortage and real wage increase in 
skilled and white collar labors experienced currently, and labor abundance 
in rural areas is the obvious indication or the segmented labor market.
Clearly, the lack of sufficient labor mobilization between sectors 
and between markets imposes an obstacle to long-term economic growth and 
stability, and also limits the variety of industrial development strategy. 
Breaking down the wall between the two segments (formal and informal 
markets) requires a package of policies targeting at both the supply
5 The agriculture contributes around 15 percent of real GDP in 1990 while covers around two-third of 
total labor force. Although the employment figure between sectors may be somewhat misleading, since 
substantial amount of farm workers also participate in non-farm activities occasionally and this 
participation rate is expected to rise, but the overwhelming proportion of agricultural employment is 
still valid.
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aspects and demand aspects of labor market. On the supply side,
encouragement of higher education, especially the high-school level, and 
provision of educational facilities, must be adopted without any 
hesitation. More important measures are on the demand side, however.
Several studies found that the major determinants of low enrollment rate 
above the compulsory elementary education (about 30 percent in 1987) are 
the demand factors. Lack of parents' positive conception upon economic 
return from higher-than-elementary education, stemming from limited job 
opportunity in the formal labor market, has been playing the major role of 
undereducation among Thai, especially the rural Thai. The problem then 
turns to the labor absorptive capability of industries and other non-
agricultural activities (such as services). As pointed out in the previous
chapter, the industrial development tended to promote capital-intensive 
industries. Not only these firms required less labors but also confined to 
the medium- to high-quality labors. The situation has been worsening 
through the concentration of industries within and around Bangkok, causing 
high labor demand in these areas while very limited job opportunity avails 
in remote areas.
If the above analysis is correct, then the right policies in 
solving these related problems should be the promotion of high-paid job 
opportunity outside the greater Bangkok area in general, and the promotion 
of regional industrialization in particular6/.
6 In fact, the development of modern agricultural sector is another solution. But since the prospect of 
agricultural products are subject to low income elasticity and persistent subsidy programs in 
developed countries, the massive development plan on agricultural production has been somewhat less
suggestive. Also, the idea may be politically difficult to implement.
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Regional disparities and Bangkok's primacy
The significance of regional disparity problem was covered partly 
in the preceding subsection, including also the statements of relevant 
policies. However, the disparity between greater Bangkok and the other
regions does not confine only to the industrial concentration. Bangkok is 
also the center of international trade, government administration, 
education, infrastructures, financial facilities, and almost all other
indications of modernization and development. Actually, the degree of 
Bangkok's primacy over other urban areas is exceptional by international 
standard7 /.
How the primacy of Bangkok effects the country's long-term 
competitiveness and sustainable growth is not an straightforward issue. In 
principal, this would not be much harmful as long as this capital city has 
a capability of servicing most economic transactions at a relatively low 
cost, as it proved to do quite well in the past when one considers the high 
economic expansion on the aggregate level. However, there has to be a 
certain point where such low-cost services are no longer feasible, mainly 
resulting from increasing congestion of the big city. After that point is 
reached, industrial firms (especially the larger firms) tend to move their 
sites to more distant areas. Of course, these areas will not be too far 
from Bangkok so that the firms still receive some certain beneficial 
aspects of big city's incumbencies. This trend is quite evident in 
Thailand during the recent economic boom in the second half of 1980s.
Increasing number of firms have been moving outside Bangkok, causing land
prices in various provinces around Bangkok rapidly accelerated.
7 Biggs and others [1990], p.24.
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What just described above is the 'natural' trend. As far as the 
policy aspect is concerned, there are several remaining questions. 
Firstly, how can the government support this trend? Secondly, is this
trend of enlarging metropolitan area acceptable or, alternatively, is it 
efficient enough for a very long-term development point of view?
Unfortunately, to answers both questions requires more in-depth analyses
and very careful comparisons to models in other countries, and is thus 
beyond either the scope of this report or the ability of the author. 
However, intuitive thinking suggests that it sounds better to develop more 
than one cities rather than to enlarge only one city just to face the 
similar problems arising from the congestion in the future. The
practicability of this policy requires strong drives in both economic and 
political elements, which has not been yet foreseeable right now.
Worsening income distribution
The problems of production imbalance, labor market segmentation, 
education imbalance, and regional disparity, altogether result in highly 
unequal distribution of income in Thailand. Moreover, the evidence (table 
4.1) shows that the distribution of income has been persistently worsening 
over the whole three decades of development since 1960s8/. The failure to 
improve income distribution is not only in itself a kind of policy failure 
in achieving one basic economic target, but it also has certain impacts on 
the sustainability of future economic growth and development. Highly 
unequal distribution usually results in small domestic market. On one 
hand, the smallness of domestic market renders the country to be less
8 However, it should also be noted that the high rate of economic growth (especially in the agricultural 
sector during 1960s and 1970s) has helped reducing poverty incidence substantially in spite of 
worsening income distribution.
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preventive to short-term external shock such as cyclical slowdown of world 
economy. On the other hand, it also hurts the development of domestic 
industries through decelerating, or even prohibiting, either the benefit 
from economy of scale (if competition is allowed among many firms in small 
market) or the industrial efficiency (if monopoly or oligopoly is 
permitted). In such case, industrialization must relies entirely on 
export-oriented policy without significant benefit from developing within 
sizable domestic market. In many cases, the restriction of small domestic 
market is capable of explaining the failures of import substitution 
strategy in developing a self-dependent industries.
Technological dependency
As pointed out earlier, Thailand's industrial development taken so 
far has one prominent aspect that it is highly dependent on imported 
foreign technologies, especially the production technologies. There are at 
least two weak points of technological dependency with respect to the 
resource allocation. Firstly, if imported technologies are fully adopted 
in their original forms without meaningful adaptation to local resource 
abundance, the inefficient uses of resources are certainly the outcome. 
This is, by and large, Thailand's experience. The second point is that 
technological dependency usually induces burden on external balance, 
through high import of technologies, most remarkably those embodied in 
machineries and capital goods. Again, this is the case in Thailand. 
Currently, there is also increasing threat of more effective claims on 
intellectual property rights and technological know-how from the United 
States that might result in the increase of technological payments in the 
future. The policy response to this issue should be exerted in two time
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frames. In the short-term, any policy measures that effect the relative 
factor price, such as the industrial promotion policy, should take into 
account the impacts of the artificially distorted relative factor prices on 
their abuses. Theoretically, technologies or combination of technologies 
that use factor inputs in accordance to the existing resource abundance 
yield the highest social welfare. However, this argument derives from the 
static comparative advantage theory. In case of dynamic comparative 
advantage, government intervention may justifiably distort the relative 
factor price to stimulate intensive use of selected factors (say, capital) 
which have high potential of future productivity improvement under
promotion received. But this sort of price distortion should be done 
marginally and gradually, and should also impose only on selected
industries of high potential comparative advantage.
Inadequate domestic saving
Another chronic problem in Thai economy is the very low national 
saving rate. The immediate consequence of this low domestic savings is the 
country's high reliance on foreign savings if continual growth is to be 
maintained. Although this is not much harmful to the growth performance as 
long as sufficient external funds are available and the debt burden is 
under control, but it may not be as much welcome if the amount of foreign
investments are so high that the ownership structure of domestic assets is
persistently running out of indigenous residents' hands9/. Moreover, 
depending on foreign financial sources may cause serious economic
9 However, the welfare evaluation of foreign direct investment in this issue is much more complicated if 
the question is generalized to cover the whole world economy rather than tied to national welfare of 
any specific country. It is also difficult to evaluate the very long-term cost-benefit of assets’ 
structural change.
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volatility during the time of either external or internal disturbances, 
within such conditions, the foreign capitals may flight away. This will 
necessitate painful adjustments afterward. To these respects, stimulus of 
more enthusiastic national saving behavior is essential. Unfortunately, 
Thailand has not much progress in this area. In fact, during 1986-1988 
Thailand had an impressive saving ratio stemming from larger proportion of 
reinvestment people spent out of their increasing income (from export and 
economic boom) in response to high perceived profitability, but the trend 
was revised again since 1989 when private consumption began to rise, 
probably from wealth effect. Low saving rate was reinforced by high 
investment level in pushing the current account deficit to be on rising 
trend during 1989-1990. This happened in spite of the rapid financial 
deepening, as can be seen from steady increase in ratio of M2 to GDP. This 
may mean that the transformation from informal saving to formal saving so 
far has not significantly helped increasing the overall saving. The 
improvement of financial instruments and financial institutional 
development to encourage saving have to be continued.
4.3 P r o g r e s s e s  o f  Th a i l a n d 's Ec o n o m i c  Ma n a g e m e n t
The fundamental problems of Thailand mentioned so far are the 
important impediments to future development. As discussed earlier, the 
external conditions for Thai economy considered so far are likely to be
favorable, at best, and not harmful, at worst. The remaining problem thus
lies upon how the internal problems and constraints be dealt with or,
alternatively, how policies can be most properly (or properly enough)
initiated and implemented to utilize this external opportunity.
50
Fortunately, the issues are not totally ignored, as can be seen 
from wide discussions and constant push to the government to solve the 
problems, and every governments usually recognize the situations. However, 
it seems to be not until the decade 1980s that substantial efforts were 
commenced. Surpluses in public budget beginning in 1987 offer the 
government an opportunity to give up various market interventions that used 
to be major sources of budget financing. Another force that is rousing 
greater attempts to solve the country's fundamental problems is the spirit 
of export promotion which has been the top prior policy since the export 
boom in mid-1980s. Any policies and measures that can encourage export are 
quickly and widely implemented. Among those measures, the promotion of 
market mechanism is perhaps the foremost strategy, with the understanding 
that higher competition can enhance the efficiency of resource allocation 
and will finally end up in better comparative advantage of Thai exports.
Generally speaking, the idea of increasing resource mobilization 
through market mechanism is fairly accepted. More specifically, the most 
stable way to raise Thailand's national welfare is the arrangement of 
domestic resource use to be most suited to external environment. Export- 
led development is gaining justification since it coincides with more 
efficient use and higher mobilization of resources which are necessary 
conditions to assure competitiveness in the world market. ,
The following sections summarize Thailand's experiences of export 
promotion and liberalization, the recent progresses, and the on-going 
measures aiming at encouraging market mechanism.
Export promotion strategies
Thailand has generally adopted the economic ideology of export-led 
strategy since the 1970s but has more meaningfully pursued since the early 
1980s. The government's principal export promotion measures conducted so 
far can be listed as below.
1) Relaxation of export tax and tariff system so as to reduce or
eliminate tax burden on major export items, especially on the agricultural
exports.
2) Adopting more active exchange rate policy to (a) prevent the
possible deterioration of Thai exports' competitiveness from US. dollar
revaluation (the 1978 and 1981 devaluations) and (b) to increase the 
flexibility of exchange rate (1984).
3) Reordering the export activities to be on the top priority to be 
eligible for promotional privileges from the Board of Investment (BOI).
4) Streamlining official procedures relating to export activities.
The efforts were quite payable that they played a considerable role
in bolstering the robust export performance during the second half of 
1980s, which led to the overall economic boom in the subsequent years. As 
pointed out in the previous chapter, one feature of the latest export boom 
was the success of various new labor-intensive manufactured goods, whose 
productions have been thereafter expanded rapidly. Although these new 
products are gaining benefits from the BOI promotion (most remarkably via 
tax incentives) but, taking into account that the BOI privilege structure 
is still capital-encouraging, market mechanism seems to play more important 
role in boosting export. Instead of on competing for BOI privileges, which 
resulted in low labor absorption ate in the past, Thai manufacturers are 
increasingly interested in seeking the most suitable way in utilizing the
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country's huge labor supply. The rapid rise of jewelry, artificial flower, 
footwear, assembly of integrated circuit, as the major export items is 
reflecting this trend. This is certainly a promising movement that can 
assure more dynamic and more efficient allocation of resources, which will 
lead the country to the least-cost productions and better competitiveness.
Rationalizations of energy price controls
The government also registers a substantial progress in relaxation 
and rationalization of energy price control. Wholesale and retail prices 
of petroleum products were controlled and heavily intervened after the two 
oils crises in 1970s. The government used to set the entire chain of 
petroleum price from import price to retail price, using the 'oil fund' as 
the buffer fund. The price structure during 1978-1985 was set in favor of 
diesel and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) by taxing more on gasoline. This 
policy quickly proved to be a mistake. It incurred social loss from 
widespread misuse of petroleum products such as the transformation of 
automobile engines to be able to use lower-price LPG and diesel. Moreover, 
having energy price controlled was likely to cause problem during the time 
of rising world price, because raising domestic retail price always aroused 
public protest and occasionally ended up in political disorder. The 
suppressed domestic prices were harmful to the economy through private 
overspending and augmenting external deficit. This really happened during 
the first half of 1980s.
To solve the problem, the government first rationalized energy 
price by reducing price difference between gasoline and other petroleum 
products in 198 . However, control on wholesale and retail price is
maintained. Just recently (May 1991), oil companies were allowed to set
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their own retail prices while the government still control the wholesale 
price, which is also expected to be deregulated in the near future. When 
the relaxation of whole price system of petroleum products are completed, 
market mechanism will play the most efficient role in determining the
proper energy use and free the oil price issue from political influence.
Financial deregulations
Although Thailand's financial sector has been quite successful in 
supporting the economic growth throughout the entire period of past
development, its functioning was circumscribed to some restrictions. Until 
recently, the government set ceilings to both the deposit and lending 
interest rates. All activities involving foreign exchange were strictly
controlled by the Bank of Thailand. Financial sector was regulated for the 
reason that it had not been so deepened as to prevent itself from causing 
damages to the overall economy.
However, the financial sector has developed very quickly during 
1980s. One indication is the rapid rise of M2/GDP ratio from 38.5% in 1981 
to 67.4% in 1989. During the same period, competition among financial 
institutions increases despite the fixed number of commercial banks. 
Finance and security companies as well as other institutions such as the 
insurance and leasing companies emerges as the new competitors to the
commercial banks. The development of stock exchange market also adds more 
varieties to the capital acquisition channels.
The government thus decided to gradually deregulate the financial 
market. In February 1991, the ceiling interest rates on deposits were 
abolished while the ceiling rate on loan interest was lifted up to annually 
19% in order to provide higher flexibility of interest rate determination.
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Interest rates are thus now determined by demand and supply of financial 
liquidity with satisfactory level of competition among financial 
institutions.
The most interesting development in financial market is the 
deregulation of foreign exchange. Thailand declared the adoption of the 
IMF's article no. 8 in May, 1990, and the 'second round' deregulation in 
April, 1991. Depending on the amounts involved, controls on foreign
exchange transactions were either abolished or relaxed. Exports are free
from any exchange restriction, except those exceeding a certain amount 
(500,000 baht) are still subject to minimal authorization. Imports are
totally deregulated. Capital inflows for investments in all forms are 
permitted freely, including the investment repatriations. Foreign currency 
accounts are allowed to be open with commercial banks, making possible the 
management of foreign exchange to avoid exchange risks. Details of the two 
foreign exchange deregulations are shown in Annex.
Reduction of domestic industries protection
Another important measure to promote market competition is the
reduction of protection given to domestic industries. In July, 1991, the 
government has for the first time in almost thirty years lowered the tariff 
rate on imported personal cars and pickups, together with the allowance to 
import these cars. Immediately, the effective rate of reduction on
domestic retail prices of car averages to 15-20%, and prices are expected 
to be even lower in the near future when competition from imported cars 
begins. Tariff rate on import of computers and components has just been 
reduced, from averaged 30% to only 5%.
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The aim of the policy is to stimulate domestic manufacturers to 
improve their production quality with lower cost, if they wish to compete 
with foreign producers. The successes or failures of these industries are 
more determined by market mechanism, rather than by protection and 
promotional privileges from the government.
Lessening government's economic role and privatization
Along with all the above measures in promoting market mechanism 
within private sector, the government has since mid 1980s maintained its 
low involvement to economic activities through reducing public spending to 
GDP ratio, from 19.7% in 1985 to 14.7% in 1989. During the same period, 
the government's revenue increased from 15.8% of GDP to 18.3% of GDP. This 
resulted in rapid increase of budget surplus and public treasury fund. The 
government is now the biggest saver in Thai economy, and helps reducing 
pressure on current account deficit induced by strong private domestic 
demand. This budgetary stance is also expected to continue in order to 
calm down the country's overheated economy.
Privatization is another area in which efforts have been made 
continually. However, the form of Privatization is not the transformation 
of public enterprises to private ones (which is objected quite severely 
from state enterprises' labor union). Instead, private companies are 
invited to invest, in place of state enterprises, in various huge 
infrastructures and public utilities. Good examples are the concessions 
given to C.P. group of companies to expand telephone network, the Canadian 
Lavalin's elevated train project, and the Hopewell's mass transit project.
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4,4 Th e Desired Long-term Development Policies
The progress of market-orientaion policies discussed above is quite 
promising for the future of Thailand. However, this does not mean that the 
government can overlook the necessity of paving the way for long-term 
development. Market mechanism usually fails to function properly when 
dealing with the country's long-term benefits in the areas in which 
economic externalities prevail. The discussions of Thailand's fundamental 
problems in section 4.2 suggests that there remain three areas that require 
immense improvement--the regional development and human resource 
development. Both areas are the major concerns in long-term development and 
can hardly be corrected or improved solely by the private sector. Regional 
development requires a big push from the central government not only by 
allocating much higher expenditure outside Bangkok but also by 
rearrangement of political and administrative structure in favor of 
regional provinces. Development of human resources requires huge 
investments to provide students with basic skills that will be their assets 
for further on-the-job trainings in private sector. Obviously, these long­
term development issues need well preparation and efficient arrangement of 
Thai government.
Chapter 5 
Summary and Lessons from Thai 
Economic Developments
As a country of considerable success in some aspects of economic
development, the study of Thai economy and her economic policies is 
certainly worthwhile. Many lessons can be drawn from Thai case, although 
some of them should not be applied directly to other developing countries, 
but they can provide better understandings of how certain economic or
political policies affect the economic performance of the country with 
natural resources, historical, and political backgrounds similar to
Thailand. Whereas the conclusions or notices drawn from Thai case are 
necessarily specific to Thailand, it is hopeful that some general 
observations could be found and are useful for making comparisons or even 
recommendations to other economies.
The chapter begins with summary of factors underlying Thailand's 
economic growth success. Then, the weaknesses of Thai development are
mentioned. The lessons from Thai case are drawn in the final section.
5.1 T h e  Fa c t o r s  o f  Su c c e s s
Among other things, the following factors seem to be the major 
contributors to the high and steady economic growth of Thailand:-
a) Thailand is a country of abundant natural resources and sizable 
fertile areas, which are very suitable for various agricultural activities. 
Through utilizing this resource richness (mostly via land expansion),
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agricultural growth and production diversification have been a strong base
of the country's economic growth.
b) The high agricultural productivity rendered the country strong
competitiveness. Agricultural export earnings was providing financial 
resources and surpluses that helped stabilizing the economy and financing
subsequent industrialization.
c) Industrial and service sectors have been developed rapidly under 
the government's support through investment promotion policies. Foreign 
investments and entrepreneurs are welcomed and protected.
d) The promotion of private investments undertaken for more than
three decades has contributed to the strength of the private sector. Thai
resident entrepreneurs were (and are still) highly responsive and flexible 
to either external shocks or changes in government policies. This dynamic 
nature of private sector is one of Thailand's most valuable assets.
e) The dynamism of Thai entrepreneurs has enabled them efficiently 
exploit the export opportunity whenever available, especially since mid 
1980s when both external and internal conditions were favorable.
f) The macroeconomic management of Thai government is in general
supportive to the stability and high growth. Conservative monetary 
policies have been fairly successful in maintaining both internal and 
external stability (inflation and balance of payment), except during the 
two oil crises, of course. Before mid 1980s, fiscal policies were 
frequently expansionary ones.
g) Finally, Thai society has a distinctive nature that bolster both 
the economic and political stability: various interest groups tend to
peacefully compromise and share benefits. Also, racial conflicts have 
maintained at minimal level and hardly obstructed economic development.
59
Although quite successful in term of economic growth, the 
development of Thai economy has a number of flaws, as mentioned to in the 
preceding two chapters. The essences of these negative aspects of 
development may be summarized as follows.
a) Although Thai governments were appropriately preparing physical 
infrastructures during 1960s and 1970s, they put too less efforts in 
developing human resources which are equally essential for long-term 
development, especially during the transit period from an agricultural 
country to industrial one. The past development policies were 
discriminating in favor of the accumulation, mostly through importing, of 
physical capitals without adequate expenditures on massive education. The 
shortage of right labors in certain industries is therefore the major 
problem nowadays.
b) The underdevelopment of human resources has been fueled by 
policies on both the industrial and agricultural sector. Through most 
investment promotion acts, industries were motivated to use more imported 
capitals, a few highly-skilled labors, and very few unskilled labors. On 
the other hand, expansion of agricultural lands was practically allowed 
(though forest encroachment is illegal), and hence retaining huge amount of 
agricultural labors requiring little education. The results are 
segmentation of labor market, scant rural- to-urban migration (except to 
Bangkok), and low demand for higher education among farmers.
c) While Thai entrepreneurs are quite successful in developing firm 
and financial managements, they seem to be relatively weak as far as 
production technologies are concerned. Thai economy is thus dependent on
5.2 T h e  W e a k n e s s e s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t
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various forms of imported technologies, which has been making Thailand a 
chronically deficit economy. Although insufficiency of engineers is one 
reason, lack of enthusiastic attitude toward technological development 
should be more relevant. The progress in this area is very little so far.
d) The regional imbalances on both the economic and political
fronts has caused persistently rising income inequality during the entire
period of development. Urban areas, Bangkok in particular, are much more
advanced and modernized than rural areas in almost all aspects.
5.3 So m e  Le s s o n s  f r o m  Th a i Ec o n o m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t s
The indications of strong and weak aspects of Thailand's economic 
developments in the above two sections intuitively lead to some lessons 
from Thai case. As mentioned at the beginning, specific locational and 
historical backgrounds could make many of the above considerations of both 
the positive and negative aspects of development applicable only to 
Thailand. However, a number of general conclusions can also be made.
Firstly, the success of economic development in which dynamism of 
private sector is spirited up along with governments' minimal but prudent 
guidances is once again warranted by Thailand experience. The rapid 
growths of agricultural production and exports since 1960s, and of 
manufacturing exports in 1980s, have been driven primarily by flexibility 
and prompt response of private sector. Meanwhile, the governments maintain 
their roles of providing suitable conditions for long-term growth-- through 
preparation of economic infrastructures at the beginning and loosely 
monitoring private sector thereafter--which have been accompanied by 
efficient managements to restrain economic stabilities.
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Secondly, the experiences of Thailand concerning the governmen 
support for long-term development indicate that public policies should bi 
properly divided between investments in physical infrastructures am 
investments in human infrastructures. Thailand gave more weight 01 
physical side--making her economy expanded rapidly so far--but its growtl 
sustainability is increasingly challenged by constraints of humai 
resources. Besides, this problem has close linkage to other fundamental 
problems: employment imbalance between traditional and developed sectors,
regional and income disparities, labor market segmentation. All these 
problems are the negative sides of Thai development, which can obstruct the 
country's future growth. If more attention had been given to human 
resource devleopment earlier, economic growth would have been less 
impressive but, at the same time, more stable and balanced growth without 
creating social conflicts would have been the result.
The third lesson from Thailand concerns the importance of how a 
country manage its technological capability and the government involvement 
in this area. Without proper guidance via strong incentives and subsidies 
from the governments, the development of techonologies --one the most
important public goods in most developing countries --may not be most
beneficial to the country. In Thailand, production technologies in
industrial sector have been mostly adopted via imported capitals, but have
been hardly adapted to local environment and assimilated to the community. 
The adaptation and assimilation of technologies require indigenous efforts 
and initiation from governments. Failures of doing so would result in 
either laggard industrial development, or foreign capital dependency and 
chronic external deficits as in case of Thailand.
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Fourthly, Thailand's experience shows that wide openness to world 
economy has proved to be one of the most valuable asset of any countries 
desiring to increase their economic dynamism and responsiveness. Although 
Xand- has the problem of capital dependency as just mentioned to, it is 
owed to improper technological management of the country and is not the 
problem of openness per se. Rather, trade and capital transactions with 
the world market engenders better allocation of resources and arouses 
higher disciplines of domestic entrepreneurs through higher competition 
from aboard.
The fifth lesson involves the industrial promotion strategies. 
Although promotions of certain industries are necessary in order to make 
those industries viable at their commencements, but the promotional 
measures should be carefully designed and implemented, and their 
effectiveness should be repeatedly evaluated. The necessary condition for 
policy success is that the designs of promotional measure must not create 
prevented monopoly within a small domestic market. The absence of 
competition from foreign products prevents the industries from efficient 
production, while the smallness of domestic market prevents the industry 
from maturation and economy of scale.
It is widely known that Thailand in 1990s is entering the economic 
era of market-orientation and deregulations. Obviously, more interesting 
lessons can be drawn from this new economic managements. The outcomes will 
be compared to experiences of other countries in order to reach more 
general rules of economic development.
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FIGURES 
AND ANNEXES
Table 2.1 Planted Areas of Major crops
Year Rice Ma i ze Cassava Sugarcane Kenaf
(mi 11.Hect) / tU ai a _ _1 U ft/* f \ m mnOUSaDQ n CCl«/
1950 5.54 36.2 na. 53.9 5.0
1951 5.96 41.4 na. 70.1 14.1
1952 5.37 45.0 na. 73.8 10.7
1953 6.17 47.7 na. 82.6 9.6
1954 5.56 53.0 na. 95.8 5.9
1955 5.77 55.5 na. 103.5 8.5
1956 6.02 82.2 39.2 121.4 17.4
1957 5.08 97.0 38.4 128.5 12.5
1958 5.74 126.7 44.2 131.7 20.3
1959 6.07 199.8 62.6 148.0 44.5
1960 5.92 285.6 71.5 157.8 140.3
1961 6.18 306.6 99.4 124.2 275.2
1962 6.59 328.0 122.7 101.8 113.9
1963 6.60 417.9 140.0 149.1 153.1
1964 6.54 551.8 105.0 162.2 218.4
1965 6.55 576.8 101.9 141.3 384.2
1966 7.43 653.3 130.2 124.5 530.2
1967 6.66 662.1 140.8 149.6 348.3
1968 7.23 670.9 170.6 181.9 253.6
1969 7.58 679.7 190.9 118.2 377.3
1970 7.49 828.8 224.5 137.9 421.0
1971 7.53 1,018.9 221.4 139.5 462.6
1972 7.14 997.0 326.2 181.3 472.2
1973 8.04 1,147.5 436.0 258.6 434.2
1974 7.65 1,239.8 480.0 309.6 403.8
1975 8.52 1,296.0 594.4 391.0 326.2
1976 8.14 1,284.6 692.3 499.0 163.7
1977 8.55 1,205.4 846.9 566.6 256.5
1978 9.35 1,385.8 1,165.1 510.4 320.5
1979 9.10 1,524.6 845.8 436.8 226.9
1980 9.10 1,433.6 1,160.0 468.3 170.9
1981 9.02 1,567.4 1,270.4 617.1 186.6
1982 8.99 1,679.0 1,236.2 583.2 217.1
1983 9.30 1,688.3 1,368.3 577.1 214.9
1984 9.27 1,816.8 1,404.8 547.8 163.5
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics.
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Table 2.2 World Economy 1960-1989 (%)
Year World Industrial Countries
Growth Inflation Growth Inflation
1960 na. na. 4.5 1.8
1961 3.1 na. 4.3 1.9
1962 4.6 na. 5.1 2.5
1963 5.0 na. 4.7 2.6
1964 6.3 4.4 6.1 2.4
1965 5.6 4.8 5.3 3.0
1966 5.6 4.9 5.3 3.4
1967 3.3 4.2 3.5 3.0
1968 4.8 4.4 5.1 3.9
1969 5.7 5.0 4.9 4.7
1970 3.9 6.0 2.8 5.6
1971 3.8 5.8 3.2 5.2
1972 5.1 5.7 5.1 4.7
1973 6.0 9.4 5.7 7.7
1974 1.8 15.3 0.7 13.3
1975 0.7 13.6 -0.3 11.2
1976 4.9 10.7 4.7 8.4
1977 4.1 11.0 3.6 8.6
1978 4.2 9.4 4.1 7.3
1979 3.7 12.4 3.3 9.2
1980 2.2 15.7 1.3 12.0
1981 1.7 14.4 1.5 10.1
1982 0.3 12.7 -0.2 7.6
1983 2.4 12.8 2.7 5.2
1984 4.9 10.6 4.9 4.7
1985 3.8 10.2 3.6 4.1
1986 2.8 7.2 2.8 2.4
1987 3.6 9.2 3.5 3.0
1988 4.4 13.1 4.5 3.4
1989 na. 17.1 3.5 4.5
1960-65 4.9 na. 5.0 2.4
1966-70 4.7 4.9 4.3 4.1
1971-75 3.5 10.0 2.9 8.4
1976-80 3.8 11.8 3.4 9.1
1981-85 2.6 12.1 2.5 6.3
1986-89 3.6 11.7 3.6 3.3
1960-72 4.7 5.0 4.6 3.4
1973-82 3.0 12.5 2.4 9.5
1983-89 3.7 11.5 3.6 3.9
Source: IMF, International Finacial Statistics (1989).
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Table 2.3 Salient Features of Thai Economy 1970-1990 (%)
Year Economic
Growth
Inflation Openness 
Rate Ratio
CA/GDP Pub.S-I/
GDP
Debt/
GDP
Inter. 
Reserve
Exchange
Rate
1970 6.6 0.8 27.7 -3.5 -4.6 10.3 8.6 20.9
1971 5.0 0.4 28.2 -2.4 -5.2 10.7 8.2 20.9
1972 4.1 4.8 30.8 -0.6 -5.5 11.0 8.6 20.9
1973 9.9 15.6 33.0 -0.4 -3.0 8.4 7.6 20.6
1974 4.4 24.3 40.2 -0.6 0.2 8.5 7.2 20.4
1975 4.8 5.3 35.9 -4.1 -3.7 9.1 6.7 20.4
1976 9.4 3.8 38.0 -2.6 -6.6 9.5 6.5 20.4
1977 9.9 7.6 41.3 -5.5 -5.7 10.1 4.9 20.4
1978 10.4 7.9 39.5 -4.8 -5.8 11.5 5.6 20.3
1979 5.3 9.9 46.7 -7.6 -6.0 14.8 5.0 20.4
1980 4.8 19.7 48.9 -6.4 -8.6 17.7 3.9 20.5
1981 6.3 12.7 48.2 -7.4 -7.8 20.5 3.3 * 21.7
1982 4.1 5.2 42.7 -2.8 -9.0 23.3 3.8 23.0
1983 7.3 3.8 41.7 -7.3 -6.6 24.1 3.0 23.0
1984 7.1 0.9 42.7 -5.1 -7.9 26.0 3.1 23.5
1985 3.5 2.4 43.9 -4.1 -8.2 34.1 3.8 27.1
1986 4.9 1.9 43.6 0.6 -6.6 33.8 4.8 26.3
1987 9.5 2.5 51.1 -0.7 -2.9 32.3 4.7 25.7
1988 13.2 3.8 59.8 -2.8 0.9 25.8 4.3 25.3
1989 12.2 5.4 64.8 -3.7 2.6 23.5 5.0 25.7
1990e 10.0 6.0 68.8 -6.0 23.2 na. 25.6
1970-75 5.7 10.6 34.6 -2.0 -3.7 9.6 7.8 20.7
1976-80 7.8 8.9 44.1 -5.7 -6.5 12.7 5.2 20.4
1981-85 5.7 4.4 44.3 -5.4 -7.9 25.6 3.4 23.6
1986-90 9.9 3.8 60.3 -3.1 -1.5 27.7 4.7 25.7
1970-90 6.7 7.2 51.2 -4.0 -5.0 18.5 5.4 22.5
Note: 1. Openness ratio = % (export+import)/GDP.
2. CA/GDP = % Current Account Balance/GDP.
3. Pub.S-I/GDP = % Public Saving-Investment Gap/GDP
4. Stock of debt includes only long-term debt.
5. Inter. Reserve = International Reserve/Import per month.
6. Exchange Rate = Baht per US dollar.
7. Everage economic growth rates and inflation rates are calculated by 
regressing over time.
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Table 3.1 Thailand's Real GDP Growth Rates (1971-1989)
Year Total Agri - Manuf. Manuf. Manuf. Manuf. Other Service
GDP culture (Total) (agric) (light) (other) Industry
(1) (2+3+4) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1971 5.0 4.3 11.1 -0.9 18.0 18.0 11.1 3.2
1972 4.1 -1.7 13.2 5.8 12.2 20.3 4.8 4.9
1973 9.9 9.4 15.7 14.6 17.5 15.4 1.8 9.7
1974 4.4 2.9 6.2 13.8 5.3 1.2 5.1 5.2
1975 4.8 4.4 5.8 5.0 12.3 1.8 -0.6 5.2
1976 9.4 6.0 15.3 17.3 10.3 17.6 15.8 7.1
1977 9.9 2.3 14.3 11.6 10.8 19.2 19.4 10.2
1978 10.4 12.5 8.7 6.6 10.4 9.2 18.2 9.0
1979 5.3 -1.8 8.3 12.7 6.2 6.3 6.2 8.1
1980 4.8 1.7 2.9 -4.2 6.8 6.0 5.8 6.9
1981 6.3 5.4 6.3 8.8 5.3 5.1 2.9 7.1
1982 4.1 3.1 2.5 5.2 2.9 0.2 9.8 5.1
1983 7.3 4.4 8.4 4.4 7.0 12.7 3.9 7.9
1984 7.1 5.6 6.8 10.6 6.4 4.1 14.3 6.9
1985 3.5 6.2 -0.6 -0.4 3.5 -3.7 6.9 4.7
1986 4.9 0.3 10.8 4.8 13.5 13.7 4.9 5.0
1987 9.5 -0.2 13.3 5.4 16.1 17.3 10.0 11.1
1988 13.2 10.2 16.8 15.2 15.9 18.6 17.1 11.6
1989 12.2 6.3 14.7 11.4 14.0 17.4 19.9 11.0
1971-75 5.6 3.9 10.4 7.6 13.1 11.3 4.5 5.6
1976-80 8.0 4.1 9.9 8.8 8.9 11.7 13.1 8.2
1981-85 5.7 4.9 4.7 5.7 5.0 3.7 7.6 6.3
1986-89 10.0 4.1 13.9 9.2 14.9 16.7 13.0 9.7
1971-89 7.2 4.3 9.5 7.8 10.2 10.6 9.3 7.4
Source: NESDB.
Note: 1. Agricultural Manufactures includes food, tobacco, and beverage.
2. Light Manufacture includes textile and garment, leathers and products, 
woods and wooden products, and furnitures.
3. Other Industry includes mining, construction, and utilities.
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Table 3.2 Thailand's Real GDP Share (1970-1989)
Year Total
GPt>
Agri­
culture
(1)
Manuf. 
(Total) 
(2+3+4)
Manuf.
(agric)
(2)
Manuf.
(I ight) 
(3)
Manuf. 
(other) 
(4)
Other
Industry
(5)
Total
Industry
(2+3+4+5)
Service
(6)
1970 100.0 25.9 15.9 6.3 3.8 5.9 4.1 20.0 48.8
1971 100.0 23.9 17.6 6.2 4.6 6.8 4.3 21.8 49.1
1972 100.0 25.4 18.4 5.6 5.2 7.6 4.2 22.6 47.4
1973 100.0 27.7 19.2 5.6 5.9 7.7 3.5 22.7 45.5
19 74 100.0 27.0 19.2 6.0 5.8 7.4 3.7 22.8 46.3
1975 100.0 26.9 18.7 5.8 5.8 7.1 3.3 22.0 47.3
1976 100.0 26.7 19.7 6.1 5.9 7.7 3.6 23.3 45.7
1977 100.0 24.8 20.2 6.0 5.9 8.3 4.3 24.5 45.9
1978 100.0 24.5 20.0 5.7 5.9 8.4 4.6 24.6 45.9
1979 100.0 24.0 21.0 5.5 6.4 9.1 4.5 25.5 45.6
1980 100.0 23.2 21.3 5.4 6.5 9.4 4.3 25.6 45.9
1981 100.0 21.4 22.3 6.7 6.3 9.3 4.3 26.6 47.0
1982 100.0 19.1 21.5 6.5 6.1 8.9 5.0 26.5 49.3
1983 100.0 20.4 21.4 5.9 6.0 9.5 4.8 26.1 48.2
1984 100.0 18.0 22.4 6.6 6.3 9.4 5.3 27.7 48.5
1985 100.0 16.7 22.1 6.6 6.6 8.9 6.3 28.4 49.2
1986 100.0 16.3 23.6 6.0 7.2 10.4 5.7 29.3 49.3
1987 100.0 16.4 23.9 5.5 8.1 10.3 5.6 29.5 48.9
1988 100.0 16.6 24.8 5.7 8.3 10.8 5.4 30.2 47.5
1989 100.0 15.2 25.4 5.7 8.4 11.3 5.8 31.2 47.0
1970-75 100.0 26.1 18.2 5.9 5.2 7.1 3.8 22.0 47.4
1976-80 100.0 24.6 20.4 5.7 6.1 8.6 4.2 24.7 45.8
1981-85 100.0 19.1 21.9 6.5 6.3 9.2 5.1 27.1 48.5
1986-89 100.0 16.1 24.4 5.7 8.0 10.7 5.6 30.0 48.2
1970-89 100.0 22.0 20.9 6.0 6.3 8.7 4.6 25.5 47.4
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).
Note: 1. Agricultural manufacture includes food, tobacco, and beverage.
2. Light Manufacture includes textile and garment, leathers and product, 
woods and wooden products, and furnitures.
3. Other industry includes mining, construction, and utilities.
4. Each period average share is simple average.
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Table 3.3 Privileges provided by Industrial Promotion Acts in Thailand 1954-1977
Year
enacte
Tax & Tariff 
Measures
Non-tax 
Protective Measures
Other Measures
1954 Exempt or Reduce import tariff
- Imported Machines, Raw Materials 
Exempt or Reduce
- Profit Tax (in certain time)
- Business Tax (in certain time) 
Exempt or Reduce
- Export Tariff (in certain time)
1960 Exempt or Reduce
- Imported Machines, Raw Materials 
Exempt
- Profit Tax (2 years)
Exempt or Reduce
- Export Tariff (in certain time)
1962 Same as 1960, plus 
Exemt Business Tax
- Imported Machines
Exemt or Reduce Business Tax
- Imported Raw Materials (5 years) 
Exempt or Reduce
- Profit Tax (5 years)
Exempt or Reduce Business Tax
- Export by Producer(certain time)
1972 Abolish Exempt on
- Imported Raw Materials 
Exempt or Reduce
- Profit Tax (3-8 years)
Exempt import tariff & business tax
- Raw material & components used 
in export products
- re-export 
AI low
- deduct 2% of increase in export 
earnings from previous year 
(promoted firms only) from 
taxable profit
(others are same as 1962)____________
Prohibit (general)
- Establishing same industries
- Imports of same products
Prohibit (announced by Minister)
- Establishing same industries
- Imports of same products 
Increase Import tariff
- Same products as those protected
Same as 1960
AI low
- Out remittance (general)
- Immigrated Foreign Technicians
AI low
- Out remittance
- Immigrated Foreign Technicians 
including families
- Land holdings in excess of 
regular laws
Same as 1960, plus 
AI low
- Out repayment & Interest on 
foreign loan
Increase Import tariff
- Same products as those protected 
Special Fee (Cabinet approved)
- Same products as those protected 
(not excess 50%)
Investment Promotion Zone:
Same as normally promoted, plus
- Reduce Import tariff, Business 
tax (up to 5 years) of imported 
material, components
- 90 % reduction of business tax 
on sales
- double deduction of costs on 
transport, electricicy, water
- deduct from taxable profit by 
25% of investment in infra­
structures within 10 years of 
income from that investment.
- 50% reduction of profit tax
(to be continued to next page)
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Year Tax & Tariff 
enacte Measures
Non-tax 
Protective Measures
Other Measures
1977 Exempt again Prohibi t Export zone:
- Imported Materials, components - imports by governmnet agencies Same as those in 1972
(under certain circumstance) those products protected
AI low - sales by government those
- deduct accumulated losses from products protected
profit from taxable income No price control on products
Exempt tax on income from under protection
- Goodwill, Property rights
Exemp tax on
- dividends alloted by promoted
f i rms
AI low
- deduct 5% of increase in export
earnings from previous year
(promoted firms only) from
taxable profit
Source : Pranee Tinakorn [1987].
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Table 4.1 Income share by Population Quintile Group 
(% of total income)
Quintile 1975/76 1980/81 1985/86 1988/89
1-st 49.26 51.47 55.63 54.62
highest top 10% 33.40 35.44 39.15 37.50
second top 10% 15.86 16.04 16.48 17.13
2-nd 20.96 20.64 19.86 20.42
3-rd 14.00 13.38 12.09 12.31
4-th 9.73 9.10 7.87 8.07
5-th 6.05 5.41 4.55 4.56
second bottom 10% 3.62 3.28 2.75 2.78
lowest bottom 10% 2.43 2.13 1.80 1.78
total share 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Gini Coefficient 0.426 0.453 0.500 0.489
Variance of logarithm
of i ncome 0.530 0.602 0.737 0.737
Source : Socio-Economic Surveys.
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Annex 1.
Relaxation of Exchange Control 
(Effective May 22,1990)
Before relaxation After relaxation
E Trpdg
Commercial banks were authorized to Commercial banks were authorized to 
approve applications for most trade approve applications for all types of
transactions, except for special trade transactions,
arrangem ent for payments of goods.
2. Services/Invisibles Payments
Commercial banks were authorized 
sell foreign currencies for the 
following transactions:-
2.1 Travelling allowances (includ­
ing credit cards) of up to US$ 4,500 
per trip for a tourist and US$ 9,000 
per trip for a business man or a 
government official.
2.2 Family allowances of foreigners 
working in Thailand and of Thai 
families on pilgrimage to Mecca of up 
to US$ 5,000 per year per person.
2.3 Educational expenses abroad of 
up to US$ 13,000-20,000 per year 
depending on the country.
2.4 Certain type of services pay­
ments which can be freely remitted 
without limit such as transportation 
fees, communication fees, licence fees 
copyright fees, royalties or patent 
fees to be paid under contracts etc.
to
2.1 The amount was increased to 
US$ 20,000 per trip for all purposes of 
travel.
2.2 The amount was increased to 
US$ 50,000 per year.
2.3 The amount was increased to 
US$ 50,000 per year.
2.4 Other payments, apart from which 
were previously delegated, in the 
amount of up to US$ 50,000 per 
transaction against supporting 
documents.
3. Unrequited transfers
3.1 Remittances of funds to 3.1 Commercial banks were authorized
families and relatives living abroad to approve remittances of up to 
required prior approval. US$ 100,000 per year per person.
3.2 Remittances of funds by emigrants 3.2 Commercial banks were authorized 
or heritages of emigrants required to approve remittances of up to
prior approval. US$ i  m iHion per year per person.
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Annex 1 (continued)
Before relaxation After relaxation
4. Repayment of foreign loans that are 
not registered with the Bank of 
Thailand
required prior approval by the Bank Commercial banks were authorized to 
of Thailand. approve remittances of up to
US$ 500,000 per transaction.
5. Remittance of proceeds from sales 
of securities or funds from 
liquidation
required prior approval by the Bank Commercial banks were authorized to 
of Thailand. approve remittances of up to
US$ 500,000 per transaction.
6. Transfers of Baht into and from 
non-resident Baht account
6.1 Transfer of Baht into "trans­
ferable" account required prior 
approval of the Bank of Thailand 
except for certain cases that had been 
previously delegated to commercial 
banks for approval.
6.2 Transfer of Baht from "Blocked” 
account for the purchase of foreign 
currency required prior approval.
6.1 Commercial banks are authorized 
to approve transfers of up to five 
million Baht per account per day.
6.2 Commercial banks are authorized 
to approve transfers of up to five 
million Baht per account per day.
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Annex 2.
Exchange Regulation in Thailand 
(Effective April 1, 1991)
I. Exchange Regulations
a. Rules and Regulations
The legal basis for exchange restriction in Thailand is derived from the 
Exchange Control Act (B.E.2485) and the Ministerial Regulation No. 13 (B.E.2497) issued 
under the Exchange Control Act (B.E.2485). These laws set out the principles of controls 
under which, Notifications and Notices that prescribe the detailed procedures were issued.
b. Administration
The Bank of Thailand has been entrusted by the Ministry of Finance with 
the responsibility of administration of foreign exchange. All foreign exchange 
transactions are to be conducted through authorized bank. Authorized persons (money 
changers) only engage in the purchase of foreign notes and travellers’ cheques and the 
selling of foreign notes.
c. Prescription of currency
There are not special requirement concerning the currency to be used for 
financial settlements with foreign countries, but payments are generally made in U.S. 
Dollars.
d. Currency Regulations
1) Foreign Currency
Persons living in Thailand are required to surrender foreign exchange 
received to an authorized bank or authorized person or to deposit the same in a foreign 
currency account within 15 days from the date of receipt. Travellers passing through 
Thailand, foreign embassies and international organizations are exempted from this rule.
Forward coverages, swaps and options are generally perm itted between 
genuine traders and authorized banks.
2) Local Currency
There is no restriction on the amount off Thai currency that may be brought 
into the country. A person travelling to Thailand’s bordering countries and to other 
countries may take out local currency up to Baht 100,000 and Baht 50,000 respectively 
without authorization.
II. Bank Deposits
a. Foreign Currency Accouni
Thai individual and juristic person in Thailand are allowed to maintain 
foreign currency accounts under the following conditions
1) the accounts are opened with authorized banks in Thailand and with funds 
that originate from abroad.
8*
2) the accounts may be withdrawn either for payments of normal business 
transactions to persons outside the country upon submission of supporting evidences or for 
conversion into Baht at authorized bank.
3) the total amount of daily outstanding balances in all account must not 
exceed US$ 5 million for a juristic person and US$ 500,000 for an individual.
b. Nonresident Baht Account
Nonresidents may open such accounts with any authorized banks in Thailand. 
Funds may be freely credited into the accounts but funds credited for the following 
settlements require prior approval from the Competent Officer:-
1) as payment for the purchase of immovable assets or securities abroad by
residents.
2) as payment for investment or lending abroad by residents or for 
rem ittance to Thai emigrants living abroad in excess of the authorized amount.
No restriction is imposed on drawing fund from the accounts including 
conversion into foreign currency for remittance abroad.
III. Trade
a. Exports
Exports are free from any exchange restriction, but export proceeds value 
exceeding Baht 500,000 must be collected within 180 days from the date of export and 
surrendered to an authorized bank or deposited in a foreign currency account with and 
authorized bank in Thailand within 15 days from the date of receipt.
b. Imports
Importers may freely purchase or draw foreign exchange from their own 
foreign currency accounts for import payments. Letter of credit may also be opened 
without authorization.
c. Transactions on Invisibles
All receipts from invisibles must be surrendered to authorized banks or 
deposited in a foreign currency account within 15 days from the date of receipt.
Payments for invisibles such as service fees related to foreign trade, 
educational expenses or family allowances abroad can be made freely.
IV. Foreign Tourists
There is no restriction on the amount of foreign exchange and Thai currency that 
may be brought into the country.
Foreign visitors or persons in transit may reely take out of the country all 
foreign exchange which they had brought in without limit. However, they may not take 
out Thai currency exceeding Baht 50,000 per person except for trips to Thailand’s 
bordering countries where and amount of up to Baht 100,000 per person is allowed.
Foreign currencies may be exchanged at any authorized banks, currency exchange 
services (operated by authorized banks) or authorized money changers. Banking hours are 
from 8.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. Monday to Friday except bank holidays. Currency exchange 
services open from 8.30 a.m. to 10.00 p.m. daily, while nc authorized money changers 
open daily from 10.00 a.m. to 5 p.m. and beyond. Some offer 24 hour-service, mostly in 
hotels.
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Credit cards are acceptable in major establishments in Thailand and may be used 
to obtain local currency at pre-arranged authorized bank or currency exchange services as 
well as at some automated tell machines.
V. Foreign Investments
Foreign investors are allowed to invest through setting up of business or equity 
participation and invest in the Securities Exchange of Thailand. Foreign investments in 
Thailand which receive promotional privileges from the Board of Investment are accorded 
various incentives and special benefits.
There is no restriction on capital investment and foreign borrowing. Rem ittance 
of investment funds and foreign loans into Thailand are freely perm itted without limit, 
but foreign exchange inflows in the form of capital and loan must be surrendered to 
authorized banks or deposited in foreign currency account within 15 days from the date 
of receipt.
Repatriation of investment funds, dividends and profits as well as loan 
repayments and interest payments thereon, net of all taxes, may be made freely.
Scarcities, promissory notes and bills of exchange may be sent abroad without 
restriction.
VI. Capital Transfers bv Residents
Foreign direct investments by residents or lending to their affiliated companies 
abroad for amount not exceeding US$ 5 million per year do not require prior
authorization. Beyond this amount, permission must be obtained from the Com petent 
Officer. Remittances to Thai emigrants with perm anent residence permits abroad are
allowed up to US$ 1 million a person yearly provided that funds derived from the
emigrants’ personal assets. Remittances of funds abroad between relatives are also
allowed up to US$ 100,000 per person yearly.
VII. Gold
Residents may hold and trade domestically gold jewelry, gold coins and gold 
bullions. Import and export of gold other than jewelry are subject to licensing by the 
Ministry of Finance. Foreign tourists are freely allowed to take out gold ornam ents.
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